









The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 




































Submitted in partial fullfilment of the requirements for the degree of  
Master of Arts in Political Science 
Department of Politics 
Faculty of Humanities 




This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work.  
Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been 

















ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ....................................................................................................................... 3 
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES .......................................................................................................... 4 
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................................. 5 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 6 
Research Questions .................................................................................................................................. 9 
Hypothesis and Logic ............................................................................................................................. 10 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................................................ 13 
National Identity in South Africa ............................................................................................................ 13 
Identity and the Sociological Perspective ............................................................................................... 21 
CHAPTER 3: HISTORICAL CONTEXT ............................................................................................. 27 
Public Policy and the Nation Building Agenda in South Africa ............................................................. 28 
Conceptions of the nation prior to 1994 ................................................................................................. 29 
ANC Nation-Building Agenda in South Africa after 1994 ...................................................................... 32 
Policies and Programmes that Reflect the Nation Building Agenda ...................................................... 33 
CHAPTER 4: THEORETICAL CONCEPT FORMATION AND RESEARCH METHODS ......... 42 
Conceptions of the „Nation‟ .................................................................................................................... 42 
Measuring National Identity ................................................................................................................... 43 
Argument ................................................................................................................................................ 45 
Data Selection......................................................................................................................................... 47 
Data Limitations ..................................................................................................................................... 51 
CHAPTER 5: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ........................................................................................ 53 
Perceptions of Inclusive Citizenship ....................................................................................................... 65 
CHAPTER 6: ANATYTICAL STATISTICS & HYPOTHESIS TESTING ...................................... 70 
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 85 
Suggestions For Further Research ......................................................................................................... 88 
REFERENCES .......................................................................................................................................... 89 
APPENDIX A: National Identity Index Creation .................................................................................... 97 
APPENDIX B: Univariate Analysis ........................................................................................................ 99 
APPENDIX C: Perceptions of Inclusive Citizenship ............................................................................. 99 














I would like to thank the following people for their support in writing this thesis. Firstly, 
my advisor, Dr. Robert Mattes for his support throughout my UCT experience, thesis writing, 
and providing a literal and figurative space in DARU to refine my skills and write my thesis; 
Stephanie Burchard for her technical advice, patience, and encouragement; Erica Penfold for 
showing me ‗the ropes‘ around the Politics Department, and later, DARU; and Joanne Polzin for 
her initial support in finding my lost UCT application and then for all her administrative support 
throughout the past year and half. In the United States, I‘d like to thank the Boren Fellowship for 
making it possible to study in South Africa, and UCLA grad advisor extraordinaire Maciek 
Kolodjacziek for seamlessly surfing through the paperwork I needed in order to apply and 
receive this Fellowship.  
Countless friends and family have supported me over the years, but none more so than 
my fiancé, Taras Matla, who has been a constant source of comfort, relief and encouragement. 












LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES 
 
Table 3.1 Key ANC Policies and Frameworks that Reflected a Nation-building Agenda……… 
Table 4.1: Variables in the Analysis………….………………………………………………….49 
Table 5.1: Strength of National Identity...……………………………………………………….54 
Figure 5.1: Proud to be Called South African……………………………………………….…...56 
Figure 5.2: I want my children to think of themselves as South African………….…………….56 
Figure 5.3: Being South African is a very important part of how I see myself……………….…56 
Figure 5.4: National Identity in South Africa (1998-2008)……………….……………………..57 
Figure 5.5: National Identity in South Africa (1995-2008)……………………….……………..58 
Figure 5.6: National Identity in South Africa (by Race)………………………………….……..59 
Figure 5.7: National Identity in South Africa (South Asians)…………………………….……..59 
Table 5.2: Perceptions of the Nation……………………………………………….…………….60 
Figure 5.8: Desirability vs. Possibility of Creating One United South Africa…….…..…….…..61 
Figure 5.9: Desirable to Create One United South Africa…………………….…………………61 
Figure 5.10: Possible to Create One United South Africa…………………………….…………62 
Figure 5.11: Desirable to Create One United South Africa (Black and Coloured)………….…..63 
Figure 5.12: Desirable to Create One United South Africa (White and South Asian)…………..63 
Figure 5.13: Possible to Create One United South Africa (Black and Coloured)…………….…64 
Figure 5.14: Possible to Create One United South Africa (White and South Asian)……………65 
Figure 5.15: Perceptions of Political Freedoms………………………………………………….66 
Figure 5.16: Perceptions of Equality Under the Law……………………………………………66 
Figure 5.17: Perceptions of How the Government is Handling Narrowing the Gap Between the 
Rich and Poor…………………………………………………………………………………….67 
Figure 5.18: Perceptions of Current Economic Conditions……………………………………...67 
Figure 5.19: Perceptions of Future Economic Conditions……………………………………….67 
OLS Regression Model 1………………………………………………………………………...75 
OLS Regression Model 2………………………………………………………………………...78 













ABSTRACT       
This study investigates the changes in national identity in South Africa over time and 
examines conditions and perceptions that inform national identity. It has three areas of focus: 
examining the levels of national identity in South Africa in 2008, the most current year of survey 
data available; mapping the levels of national identity overtime from 1995 to 2008, and 
identifying sources of national identity from 2002 to 2008. Using statistical analysis, this study 
tests for interaction effects between race and notions of inclusive citizenship in the South African 
population to examine predictors of national identity. The paper explores the extent to which the 
ANC‘s program of nation building with its emphasis on inclusive citizenship, as represented by 
freedom and equity, both political and economic, has influenced the development of national 
identity. Findings indicate that the factors that inform national identity are not uniform across all 
races, neither in type nor degree; however, certain indicators prove significant across all races. 
Certain elements of the ANC nation building discourse, such as the perception of political 
freedom, affect national identity more than other elements, such as economic equity and equality 














 After the transition from apartheid to democracy in 1994, one of the first priorities of the 
newly-elected African National Congress (ANC) was to actively engage the citizenry in a 
process of nation building that emphasized inclusive citizenship. This thesis examines to what 
extent the ANC was successful in its endeavor to redefine South African national identity in the 
post-apartheid period. By focusing on ANC policies and the rhetoric of inclusive citizenship that 
supported these policies, this paper examines the degree to which elites can shape national 
identity. Following from the constructivist position, identity is seen as fluid and malleable. It 
investigates how the ANC leadership conceptualized the South African ‗nation‘ and engaged in a 
nation building program. By using national identity as the dependent variable and perceptions of 
the conditions that embody the concept of inclusive citizenship as the key independent variables, 
this paper tests the effect of elite-driven identity construction on individual attitudes. The ANC 
discourse of inclusive citizenship that was central to nation building focused on political and 
economic aspects of freedom and equity. This study examines whether individuals‘ national 
identities are informed by those preconditions that the ANC prescribed as crucial to building the 
South African nation.  
I assert that a ―New South Africa‖ was constructed after 1994. The South African 
‗nation‘ was created through free and fair elections and an aggressive nation building project by 
the ANC that sought to establish political legitimacy. In that way, the process of identity 
construction, of mobilizing and constructing a South African political identity, was prescribed 
from above. Although individuals have agency in forging their own identities, the idea of a South 












Therefore, this study focuses on identity choice in South Africa, specifically, when and why 
South Africans choose a South African national identity. Keeping in mind the relevance of elite 
roles, I examine whether the ANC political rhetoric of inclusive citizenship has informed a 
source of national identity.  
The ANC nation building strategy, which will be discussed in more detail in chapter four, 
focused on non-racial nation building. Nation building is the process of constructing or 
reconstructing a national identity that engenders loyalty to a polity. As John Bendix notes, 
―nation-building and the inclusion of new groups into citizenship is a process of finding a basis 
for authority in a new polity‖ (Bendix 2003: xiii)
. 
ANC policy statements, from the Freedom 
Charter to statements outlining guidelines for a democratic future in South Africa, emphasized 
the importance of establishing political freedoms and providing economic opportunities for every 
South African, regardless of race. It was declared that a non-racial, inclusive society was needed 
to build South African nation and solidify its democratic future. Several policies were established 
to carry out these goals, such as the Reconstruction and Development Programme and 
affirmative action policies. Hence, the notion of inclusive citizenship, as defined by freedom and 
equity, both in the political sphere and economic sphere, is central to the ANC discourse on 
nation building.  
Although the interest of this study lies in the effects of ANC discourse, I conduct 
statistical analysis of individual level data using Afrobarometer public opinion surveys rather 
than a discourse analysis.
1
 By testing for the effect of inclusive citizenship  namely the 
perception of freedom and equity  we can see whether the notion of inclusive citizenship 
informs national identity in South Africa. I conceptualize freedoms to include political and 
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 See Roper (1997) for discourse analysis of right wing discourse in constructing a South African National Identity 












economic freedoms and equity to include economic equity and equality before the law. I sketch 
ANC nation building discourses before and after 1994, and outline several public policies that 
served to implement these nation building projects. In that way, I set the context for 
understanding the ANC‘s conception of the South African ‗nation‘, and the justification for 
testing these explanatory variables through statistical analysis. By using regression analysis with 
national identity as the dependent variable and the concepts that comprise what it means to have 
inclusive citizenship- political freedom, political equity, economic satisfaction and economic 
equity- as the explanatory or independent variables, we can see whether what was assumed by 
the ANC to inform national identity in South Africa, actually does.  
Because of the nature of the survey questions, perceptions of equity and freedom are 
inevitably performance based evaluations of ANC nation building policies that have incorporated 
the values of inclusive citizenship. For example, the political freedom index is comprised of 
three questions: In this country, how free are you to say what you think?; In this country, how 
free are you to join any political organization you want?; and In this country, how free are you to 
choose who to vote for without feeling pressured? By correlating the responses to these questions 
in an index with the national identity index, comprised of questions that measure the 
respondent‘s attachment to the nation
2
, we can test whether there is a relationship between the 
respondent‘s perceptions of his or her own political freedoms and that person‘s levels of national 
identity. Invariably, this incorporates a performance evaluation of the state‘s ability to provide 
those political freedoms. This is a different exercise than establishing the relationship between 
political freedoms and national identity by simply asking respondents whether political freedoms 
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 To create the national identity index, I take the mean score of the responses to the survey questions: It makes you 
proud to be called a South African; You would want your children to think of themselves as South African. Being 













are important or necessary to one‘s national identity. I test whether the idea and manifestations of 
inclusive citizenship has been essential to establishing legitimacy of the nation, and creating a 
shared sense of ―South Africanness‖ (African National Congress 1992). 
 Understanding how South Africans define themselves gives insight into the successes and 
failures of nation-building practices in post apartheid South Africa. In addition, understanding 
the causes of national attachment is interesting because, in South Africa, there has been a conscious 
effort to construct or re-write national identity in the post-apartheid era. Further, by testing for the 
effect of the perceptions of equity and freedom, we can determine the relevance of ANC ideas of 
inclusive citizenship to building the ‗nation‘. 
By analyzing which components of inclusive citizenship impact national identification in 
South Africa, we are able to test the relevance of the ANC‘s understanding of what was 
important to nation building and the policies based on these ideas on inclusive citizenship. In 
addition, we are able to understand better the elite-level influences on identity construction and 
identity choice. If the ANC discourse on inclusive citizenship is successful in informing the 
individual‘s sense of national identity, this would have implications for national identity 
construction in other deeply divided societies. Countries struggling with national unity could 




This paper has four areas of investigation: (1) It examines the levels of national identity 












identifies predictors for national identity from 2002 to 2008, and (4) it examines race as a 
moderating variable on the predictors for national identity.  
 
 
Hypothesis and Logic 
 
The focus of this study is to examine the extent to which national identity has taken hold 
in South Africa. What are the current levels of national identity in South Africa and how have 
they changed over time? What informs a person‘s sense of national identity? And, given South 
Africa‘s unique history of racist governance, are the variables that inform national identity the 
same across all races? An investigation of how national identity is being captured and measured by 
public opinion surveys and which factors influence feelings of national identity is crucial to 
understand national identity in South Africa.  
 To fully answer these questions, I outline the following hypotheses. I would expect that as 
South Africa consolidates its democracy, as more children emerge from integrated schools taught 
by a new curriculum, and as more adults live under the ‗new South Africa‘, that national identity 
on the whole would be higher today than in previous years. I also expect that national identity is 
affected by ANC nation building policies designed to promote a sense of inclusive citizenship 
and that positive perceptions of rights and equity are positively correlated with levels of national 
identity in South Africa. 
Given South Africa‘s divided history of racial segregation, I also expect that the 
explanatory variables that inform national identity will not be uniform across race. Perceptions of 
equity and freedom will have a stronger positive effect on populations that were denied full 
citizenship rights during Apartheid (Black, Coloureds, and Asians). I expect that the importance 












population group under apartheid. The perceptions of equity and freedom will have a stronger 
positive effect for Blacks than other racial groups because that population suffered the most 
stringent denial of citizenship rights, such as voting rights, equal access to education, the labour 
market, and property. As such, I expect that rights and equity would feature more prominently in 
informing the levels of national identity for Black South Africans than for any other racial group. 
This study will simultaneously test the opposite prediction- that perceptions of rights and equity 
would be more important to minority groups who might be concerned with being marginalized in 
an ANC-dominated regime. 
As stated earlier, the South African nation in its current manifestation came to be as a 
result of the democratic elections of 1994. As such, it was a nation born from civic ideals and not 
one of ethnic nationalism. Given that the South African nation was one that was constructed as a 
civic nation, identity with the nation involved a certain degree of identity choice.
 3 
Members of 
the polity choose if and how much they identified with the new South African nation.   
There are several ways a nation building project can take form. One is a rhetoric or 
discursive manner, where, to draw from Billig‘s notion of banal nationalism, symbols, myths and 
memories are either created or shaped and consistently reinforced (1995). This can take the form 
of new national holidays, state flags, education curriculum, or the renaming of official buildings 
or streets. In the case of South Africa, some of these projects have already occurred, such as 
curriculum reform, the creation of a national flag, anthem, motto and public holidays. Other 
                                                 
3
 Note that just as civic nations can be constructed, so can ethnic nations. There is much literature around the 
constructed nature of ethnicity. To say that a civic nation is constructed and involves identity choice is not to say 
that an ethnic nation is not. Where they do differ, however, is in the relative exclusivity and inclusivity of each type 
of nation. A civic nation is able to be more inclusive since it is based around a set of ideals, in South Africa‘s case a 
set of democratic ideals, and participation in the polity. Ethnic nations, depending on how fluid the boundaries of 
group identity are, tend to be more exclusive than civic nations. Because ethnic nations are often based on the 
boundaries of certain ‗ethnic‘ characteristics, such as language, lineage, religion, place of birth, or physical 
characteristics, membership into these groups is more exclusive than that of civic nations. Boundaries that are rigid, 












projects, such as the renaming of streets and buildings and establishment of cultural institutions, 
such as Freedom Park, continue to be in process. In this case, a citizen can be habituated to the 
new symbols, myths, and memories, and engender an identity to the new nation. Likewise, being 
exposed to civic education programs would also habituate the citizen. It is also possible that 
younger citizens would feel more attachment to the nation since they would have little 
experience or memory of the old nation. For the youngest in the population, they only have a 
cognitive awareness of the new nation. In addition, as time passes, older generations may 
undergo an attitude shift, where they grow to identify with the new nation. Finally, with the 
passing of older generations, in absolute numbers, there are fewer in the population that 
remembered the previous nation.  
Some may be driven by economic factors and material gain in the new nation. This 
follows a rational choice model, where a cost-benefit analysis can be taken into consideration 
and citizens‘ decisions to adhere to a given community are guided by economic or material 
factors, such as income or poverty. This also borrows from the concepts of Maslow‘s hierarchy 
of needs, where the more basic needs of safety, such as security and employment must be met 
before needs of love, affection and belongingness (1954: 18-20). 
Institutions can also shape personal identification with the nation. In the South African 
context, institutional reform was necessary to create the new South African nation. A new 
national imagining rested upon universal suffrage and rights for all race groups. Full citizenship 
in the form of voting rights, freedom of movement rights, and property rights, affected a sense of 
belonging in the nation. The inclusive and comprehensive rights granted by the Constitution in 
















National Identity in South Africa 
 
 Just before the 1994 elections, James Barber asked what kind of identity South Africa 
would have. He wondered whether a single overriding national identity would emerge and 
whether a post-apartheid society would provide the necessary conditions to build a strong 
common identity (1994:70).
 
While certain authors predicted that specific prerequisites, such as 
non-racialism, democratic governance, socio-political conditions, reduced violence, and gender 
equality, would be necessary to build a democratic nation, few have explored what forms public 
opinion towards national identity.
4
 Little systematic and empirical testing of the factors that 
influence national identity has been done.   
 Examinations of national identity in South Africa consist of three main areas of 
investigation: identity studies, xenophobia studies, and democracy studies. The first area of 
investigation centres on shifting identities in South Africa and have been broadly theoretical in 
nature. Sociologists have investigated issues of changing social identities (such as racial, ethnic, 
national, or class) in South Africa but have not examined or measured national identity empirically 
(See Erasmus and Pieterse 1999; Marais 2001; Maré 1999). Studies that have engaged with the 
relationship between xenophobia and national identity have done so by examining national identity 
as an independent variable, predicting national identity and disaggregating results by race. 
Likewise, studies on democratic transition and consolidation have explored national identity over 
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 See National Identity and Democracy in Africa (1999) for scholarly articles outlining prerequisites. As discussed 
later, Mattes, Crush, and others engage with public opinion surveys to measure levels of national identity, but do not 












time in relation to democratic attitudes, but also treat national identity as an independent variable 
and do not disaggregate levels of identity further than by race. 
 Others explore the relationship between race and class, and argue that race informs class 
divisions today or that inequalities among the classes are what drives the current economic 
disparities in South Africa (See Buhlungu 2007; Seekings and Nattrass 2005). Instead of finding 
that inequalities have shifted from race to class, as Seekings and Nattrass assert, Buhlungu 
describes the phenomena of widening class cleavages between apartheid-era racial categories as 
an emerging pattern of non-racialism and a continued racialization of class (Seekings and 
Nattrass 2005: 46; Buhlungu 2007: 82). Racial hierarchy remains mostly unaltered, with non-
Whites comprising an overwhelming majority of the unemployed. Buhlungu sees the eradication 
of racial inequality as the only basis for a sustainable and substantive form of patriotism in South 
Africa (2007: 93), a hypothesis which will be tested later in this paper. 
Buhlungu argues that the two ―social worlds‖ between the haves and have-nots are a 
major obstacle to a shared South African identity (ibid: 91).
 
Because contact and social 
interaction between racial groups remains necessity driven, there are no arenas where South 
Africans can engage in common meaning construction and identity formation (ibid). Buhlungu 
argues that elements of inclusive patriotism have emerged, but a fully-fledged nation has not yet. 
He describes South African patriotism as contingent kind of patriotism with fragile and inchoate 
symbols where South Africans retreat to their separate social or racial worlds and withdraw from 
allegiance to the nation when faced with a crisis (Buhlungu 2007: 93). For some scholars, the 
realization of policy goals into tangible economic and social goods, which can be described as 
substantive citizenship, is directly related to the feeling of national unity.
5
 Melissen exemplifies 
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this in his statement, ―Nation-branding accentuates a country‘s identity and reflects its 
aspirations, but it cannot move much beyond existing social realities‖ (2005: 20). 
Gerhard Maré steps back from the nationalism debate and first asks the question: should a 
nation be created? (Emphasis original, 2007: 107). Collective memory is central to Maré‘s 
argument of the impossibility of the South African nation. He questions the possibility of the 
creation of a South African nation because he argues that there is a lack of shared history and 
imagined community (ibid: 104). Maré borrows from John Comaroff and finds that collective 
identities and attachments occur in the ―minutiae of everyday life‖ (ibid: 108). Maré posits that 
the challenge for South Africa is not in whether symbols of unity, such as flags, are hung in 
shared institutions, such as public buildings. Rather, he questions whether shared institutional 
life even exists given the inequality and segregation in South Africa. This is an important 
distinction to make from the argument that racial equality must precede the nation. Maré argues 
that shared space must precede the shared collective memory which is necessary to constitute the 
nation.  
 Maré does not place much value in nation-building as an aid to democratic transition or 
consolidation. He sees commitment to democracy as an alternative to the solidarity that is offered 
by nation and patriotism, both of which rely on the social identity of the ―imagined community‖ 
(ibid: 99). Instead, he argues that a commitment to democracy is much wider and carries less 
―baggage of difference‖ than a commitment to the nation (ibid). This is similar to Ivor Chipkin‘s 
argument for what he identifies as a ―democratic limit‖ instead of a ―national limit‖. Ivor Chipkin 
addresses the question of national identity in South Africa, but uses no empirical data and is 
inconclusive regarding his answer to the question (2007). Chipkin argues that the only real 












territory. South Africa‘s history to date has yet to provide a definition or delimitation of South 
African national identity and he finds that territory is not sufficient to satisfy a national limit 
because territory is not a basis for affective bonds among citizens (ibid: 190). 
By following developments in the work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Moufe, Chipkin 
proposes a solution to the problem of a demos that is not constituted of any particular measure of 
population, such as race, culture, religion, or ethnicity (ibid). According to Laclau and Moufe, 
the concept of ‗the people‘ ―emerges through the construction of equivalential bonds and the 
demarcation of an internal frontier‖ (ibid: 207). This bond can crystallize around a desire, for 
example, allowing blacks the right to vote, and this investment becomes an affect (ibid: 208). 
Thus ‗the people‘ are defined by this desire and their affection for the groups solidifies. 
Solidarity is very important and, although Chipkin does not explicitly say it, an individual will to 
be part of the group is also crucial. Thus, the democratic limit is focused around citizenship, and 
not the nation. 
Despite a thorough discussion of national identity in South Africa, none of these studies 
incorporate public opinion in the evaluation of a South African identity. As Buhlungu and 
Seekings et al. note, there remains vast economic inequality in South Africa that is often 
racialized. As Maré elaborates, there is a lack of shared space that is formed by inequality and 
segregation in South Africa.
6
 Despite this, a majority of South Africans are proud to be South 
African and find that being South African is an important part of how they see themselves.
7
 
 The second area of investigation explores national identity as it relates to xenophobic 
attitudes in South Africa (Croucher 1998; Crush and Pendleton 2004; Crush 2008; Peberdy 
2001). South African Migration Project publications have often used national identity as an 
                                                 
6
 See Durrheim and Dixon (2010) for a discussion on the frequency of contact and quality of contact between racial 
groups. 
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explanation of xenophobic attitudes, with the underlying assumption that national identity is 
correlated with higher levels of xenophobia. In this case, national identity is treated as the 
independent variable, rather than the dependent variable, as in this paper. Crush and Pendleton 
posit that South Africa‘s inclusive and aggressive nation-building project redefined citizenship 
and caused a growth in intolerance towards outsiders (2004: 4). Not only does this assume the 
success of the ANC‘s nation building project, it posits a direct and positive relationship between 
national identification and xenophobic attitudes. 
Perhaps because national identity is only treated as an independent variable, 
investigations in the literature on xenophobia are often limited to analyses by race (Crush 2008). 
Limiting the analysis to categories of race is worrisome. It ignores a myriad of other factors that 
may influence attitudes such as class, employment, age, education, perception of well being, trust 
of the state, etc. Utilizing race in this manner does what Erasmus warns against- it flattens the 
complexity of race (Erasmus 2010). Further, the continued reproduction of these categories of 
analysis in study after study further reinforces the idea that ―racialised groups are bounded, 
homogenous, and stable‖ (ibid). Rigorous analysis would tease out the factors behind race that 
influence certain xenophobic attitudes. 
 The third area comprises empirical investigations of national identity as it relates to 
maintaining and stabilizing democracy in South Africa (Mattes 2002a; Mattes 2002b; Mattes 
2004; Robinson 2009). Nation-building in new democracies with heterogeneous populations is 
often seen as a critical factor in conflict resolution and democratic consolidation. At the very least, 
agreement on who constitutes the nation has been seen as a precondition for democracy (Rustow 
1970). Additionally, several scholars have described the negative impact of ethnic politics on 












stability (Neuberger 2000; Robinson 2009; Horowitz 1985). As such, attention has been paid to 
the relationship between national identity and democratic attitudes and behaviour. Because the 
primary focus of the literature is to identify what factors effect democratic transition and 
consolidation, national identity has been explored as it relates to democratic political culture. 
Although also descriptive in nature, there have been efforts to track levels of national identity 
over time and provide a more nuanced description of national identity. 
Mattes tracks responses to questions of national identity by race from 1994 to 2000 using 
IDASA and Afrobarometer survey data (2002b). He also explores primary identification of 
respondents from 2000 Afrobarometer data. Mattes questions assumptions from the literature 
that pre-existing identities are in tension with post independence national identity and finds that 
high levels of national identity can coexist with equally high levels of identification with sub-
national social identity groups. His findings imply that nation-building projects haven‘t 
necessarily transformed group identities into a national one, but have created a transcendent 
national identity. As with the literature on xenophobia, it would have been interesting to analyze 
levels of national identity beyond race by incorporating other categories that ranked high as a 
primary identification, such as ethnic group, class, or religion. Similarly, Grossberg, Struwig, 
and Pillay find that national identity was not incompatible with having any group-based identity 
using data from the 2003 South African Social Attitudes Survey (2006: 65-6). Analyzing survey 
data from 1997 to 2000, Klandermans, Roefs, and Olivier also find that national identity and sub-
group identity are not mutually exclusive (2001: 105). 
 Garth le Pere and Kato Lambrechts refer to what happened in South Africa at the end of 
Apartheid as a “renationalization of identity (emphasis original, Le Pere and Lambrechts 1999: 












construct, the reconstruction of the ‗nation‘ in South Africa is one of the ―gradual building of 
public consensus around particular constitutional principles and values shared among various 
ethnic, language, class, religious, and cultural groupings, irrespective of their historical 
experiences‖ (ibid). In this way, multiple identities are able to coexist with one‘s national 
identity. Further, as Smith finds, in the contemporary world, the number and scale of possible 
cultural identities is increasing, and these identities may either cut across or reinforce national 
identities (1992: 58-9). 
 A study of identity construction and choice in South Africa would not be complete without a 
discussion of racial identities. As such, it is useful to note a subset of literature that examines racial 
identities in South Africa. White minority rule in South Africa relied on an official classification 
into four race groups: Africans, Whites, Coloureds, and Asians. Africans were further classified into 
a dozen ethnic groups. This classification formed the basis for the allocation of rights. Substantively, 
allocation of rights awarded Whites full citizenship, Coloureds and Asians partial citizenship, and 
Blacks no citizenship.  In a discussion of apartheid racial classifications, Posel raises the important 
point that the power of these categories resulted from the imprecision rather than the precision of 
these categories (2001: 57). Although the Tricameral Constitution of 1983 was a major reform of 
apartheid, it continued to deny Africans the national franchise and allowed the other 3 groups the 
right to elect separate chambers of parliament (Lijphart 2001: 13). Instead, Africans were granted 
citizenship in the independent homelands. 
  There is evidence of how the program of Apartheid hardened race categories. Mattes 
reports that 20% of South Africans surveyed in 2000 continued to use racial category as their 
primary identification (2002b: 85). South African Social Attitudes Survey data from 2003 brings 












and an important to the way people define themselves (Grossberg et al. 2006: 66). Further, use of 
racial categories in the census, bureaucracies, policies and programs such as affirmative action, and 
even survey research continue to play a role in the hardening of these identities.
8
 This draws from 
Nagel, who asserts that formal ethnic labels and policies are more powerful forces of identity 
than informal ethnic meanings and transactions (1994: 156). Although specifically referring to 
ethnic identities, Nagel‘s discussion of formal and informal identity labels can apply to racial 
identities as well. As a result, race is often treated as fixed in many studies, as described above.
9
  
 Van Evara, who I describe as a soft primordialist later in this chapter, reminds us that 
identities can solidify based on certain factors (2001). In the South African case, Apartheid created 
and harden racial identities to the extent that many treat South Africa‘s racial categories to be fixed, 
despite the understanding that race is a social construct. Most scholars have discarded a biological 
conception of racial classifications. However, when scholars use race as the foremost explanatory 
variable to explain attitudes, they submit to the hardening of these categories and also perpetuate 
them. Despite this, disregarding race completely as a variable in any study of South Africa would be 
careless. It would not take into consideration the vast and lingering effects that the apartheid system 
had on group identification and identity construction. For these reasons, I disaggregate the levels of 
national identity by race as other scholars have done. However, instead of concluding the analysis 
there, I go further by testing for interaction effects between race and elements of inclusive 
citizenship. 
 The literature on democratic political culture provides a useful base for my study because 
the empirical analysis of national identity is treated in a more nuanced way than the literature on 
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 Chandra (2001: 8) gives a comprehensive overview of the constructivist contributions to understanding the fluidity 
of ethnic identity and argues that despite this, many scholars continue to treat ethnic identities as fixed. This applies 












xenophobia. Some studies examine explanatory variables for national identity beyond race, such as 
age, province, class, and language, but they provide little analytical leverage in explaining national 
identity (Grossberg et al. 2006). Because South Africa under apartheid was divided by race, 
examining responses to questions of national identity by race is a logical and necessary starting 
point. However, it is likely that race alone is not the sole determinant of national identity. Treating 
identity in this way allows for a shallow analysis of a complex problem and does not assist in 
understanding what ―lives behind the categories of race‖ (Erasmus 2009). Because the purpose of 
this study is to identify what elements of inclusive citizenship inform national identity, race is 
treated as a moderating variable, one of many that influences national identity. 
 
Identity and the Sociological Perspective — Primordialist, Constructivist, Instrumentalist, 
and Institutionalist Debates 
 
 I assert that national identity is primarily seen as constructed, involving a sphere of shared 
values, a sentiment of solidarity (Weber in Gerth and Mills 1948: 175-6), based on an imagined 
community (Anderson 1983). It is sometimes achieved through the invention of tradition 
(Hobsbawm 1983) and the transformation of aspects of pre-existing culture (Gellner 1983). As this 
paper explores the factors that influence post-Apartheid South African national identity, national 
identity is taken as a constructed civic identity. Because South African nation building formed 
around notions of civic ideals- namely freedom and equity- and not the membership of a specific 
ethnic group, the South African ‗nation‘ can be seen as a civic nation, rather than an ethnic nation.
10
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As Heribert Adam argues, the ideology of non-racialism itself rejects an ethnic nation in favour of a 
civic nation, one built on the foundation of equal individual rights and based on consent rather than 
descent (Adam 1994: 17). Considering this, the constructed nature of identity choice and formation 
is relevant. However, it is useful to discuss the theories of identity from a sociological perspective as 
this academic field has examined this subject in depth and sheds light on understandings of identity 
choice and construction.   
 A discussion of primordial and constructivist approaches to the understanding of ethnic 
identity is necessary for several reasons. First, these approaches are useful frameworks to 
understand identity construction in general, and not only ethnic identity construction in specific. 
Secondly, the difference between ethnic group and nation is not always clear and scholars often 
conflate the two. Scholars sometimes use ethnic group and the nation interchangeably.
11
 In other 
studies the emergence of the nation is considered solely a phenomenon of modernization and often 
associated with the Age of Enlightenment and the French Revolution (Hobsbawm 1990: 80; De 
Celia et al. 1999: 154). In some scholarly research, nation, ethnic group, ethnic nation, and nation-
state are often confusingly interwoven (Connor 1994: 40). 
 Crawford Young identified a framework for the study of identity that is comprised of three 
approaches: primordialist, instrumentalist, and constructivist (1993). The essence of the 
primordialist position on identity assumes that identities are fixed. Clifford Geertz elaborates two 
central tenets of the primordialist perspective, that individuals have a single ethnic identity and that 
ethnic identity is fixed in the present and future (1973). Although these identities are fixed, the 
origins of these fixed identities are not always clear. Biological or natural primordialism 
incorporates ideas of human biology in identity construction (Reynolds et al. 1987). While some 
                                                                                                                                                             
constructivist standpoint, a diverse civic nation, woven together by a set of ideals, would be possible. A democratic 
limit and a national limit would not be mutually exclusive, as Chipkin presents. 
11












attribute these identities to biological differences, others, so-called ‗soft primordialists‘, attribute 
these identities to social construction in the past (Connor 1994; Van Evera 2001). In either case, 
these identities are presumed to be fixed once acquired. The ‗primordial‘ ties of language, religion, 
race, ethnicity, and territory are deemed crucial to identity (Shils 1957).  
 Constructivists on the other hand, have shown that ethnic groups are fluid and affected by 
social, political, and economic processes.
12
 Individuals can have multiple identities. In some 
theories, modernization is an important variable for ethnic group or nation formation. Deutsch, 
Gellner, Anderson, Hobsbawm, Breuilley, and Mann attribute the development of an identity to 
certain aspects of modernization (Deutsch 1953; Gellner 1983; Anderson 1983; Hobsbawm 1990  
Breuilly 1995; Mann 1995).  In the case of Anderson, the rise of print capitalism is essential to the 
formation of imagined communities. Deutsch asserts that industrialization and the increased 
communication facilities lead to national communities (1953). Gellner attributes the rise of 
industrialization and urbanization as the influential variable in nationalism (1983). Resource 
competition and the rational choice perspective would assume that individual actors make decisions 
on their identity based on cost-benefit analysis or the perceived benefits of certain identification 
over another (Laitin 1995; Banton 1983; Barth 1969; Bonacich 1972; Olzak 1989; Olzak 1992). 
Competition over resource niches can shape or shift ethnic boundaries (Banton 1983; Barth 1969) as 
can competition over shares of the informal labour market (Bonacich 1972; Olzak 1989; Olzak 
1992).  
 Institutionalism can be seen as another component of the constructivist approach. Wimmer 
and Posner highlight the importance of the institutional context in explaining group identification 
(Wimmer 1997; Wimmer 2008; Posner 2005). In his book, Institutions and Ethnic Politics in 
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Africa, Posner highlights how institutions can shape identity with the case of Zambia, where he 
shows that the ethnic identities people choose can be effected by institutions, state policies, 
regulations, and administrative structures (2005: 7). Posner examines how multiparty rule creates 
an environment where language becomes salient, and one party rule incentivizes the use of 
ethnic identification. 
 Even the process of nation state formation makes the drawing of boundaries possible, 
creating an incentive structure which promotes certain identity choice (Miles 1993; Hobsbawm 
1990; Tilly 1996).
13
 Nagel discusses the influence in external forces shaping ethnic boundaries 
and the ways that identity can be negotiated, defined, and produced by political policies and 
institutions (1986). ―As the state has become the dominant institution in society, political policies 
regulating ethnicity increasingly shape ethnic boundaries and influence patterns of ethnic 
identification‖ (1994: 156-7). 
 In addition to modernization and the effect of institutions, political entrepreneurship is 
another factor in the construction of ethnic groups. This area of study is informed by the 
instrumentalist approach, where ascriptive identity, such as race, ethnicity, tribe, language and 
religion, is seen a function of the modern nation state and a tool of political elites (Toffolo 2003: 3). 
In this approach, Barth notes that identities are fluid, malleable, responsive to political mobilization, 
ethnic entrepreneurs, and state policies (1969). ―Playing the ethnic card‖, or when political elite use 
ethnicity and the notion that ethnic groups must stick together to safeguard its interests in order to 
win political support, has been investigated in several studies (Eifert et al. 2010; Ferree 2006; 
Posner 2004; Posner 2005; Young 1976). Most recently, Eifert, Miguel, and Posner explore the use 
of ethnicity as a political tool for power through their examination of the saliency of ethnic identity 
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during election time (2010). This approach can be seen as a variation of either primordialism or 
constructivism, depending on whether the tools in questions are deemed to be fixed or constructed. 
However, the mere fact that identities can be shaped by political elites or political entrepreneurs 
denotes that identities, whether ethnic or national are, in fact constructed.  
 The instrumentalist approach, another variant of the constructivist approach, is especially 
relevant to the role of elites in identity construction, as elites are the most likely to mobilize these 
instruments to reach a political end. Several scholars have examined elite-driven models of 
identity construction (Cruz 2000; Dragović 2005; Handler 1984).
14
 The instruments in question 
can either be an existing group identity, such as ethnicity, race, or class, a characteristic associated 
with a particular group identity, such as language, religion, or a physical characteristic, or 
principles, such a democratic values or citizenship. The latter instruments are most relevant to this 
study of national identity in South Africa as I test whether elite messages of the ANC nation-
building rhetoric of inclusive citizenship have an effect of national identity. In this case, the 
instruments of inclusive citizenship in use are the ideals of a non-racial society built on political and 
economic freedom and equity. As South Africa can be seen as a civic nation rather than an ethnic 
nation, these ideals are more relevant to nation building than nation building strategies that 
mobilize around certain characteristics that can be considered ethnic, such as language.
15
 
 Much of the argument between constructivism and primorodialism lies in disagreement over 
how fixed or fluid these identities are. Stephen Van Evara argues that it makes sense to maintain the 
assumptions that ethnic identities are fixed for analysis. He does not argue that ethnic identities are a 
result of biology as some other primordialists do. He adheres to socially constructed nature of ethnic 
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identity, but argues that they should be treated as fixed because they harden as a result of certain 
factors- such as literacy and violent conflict with others. 
 Regardless of the debates around the fixed or constructed nature of national and ethnic 
identity, the post apartheid South African case in particular, is one of a constructed national identity, 
focused around a set of democratic ideals in a plural society. As such, measuring the success of a 
constructed social identity and the factors that correlate with those successes is helpful to 
understanding the dynamics of identity construction and choice.  
Many would say that South Africa has a long way to go in terms of nation building. For 
those who assert that social and racial equality precedes the creation of the nation, the continued 
economic disparities between the races indicate that a nation has not yet been created. Instead of 
examining racial and class disparities or relying on a theoretical framework that places equality 
before the nation, I borrow from Anthony Smith and try to measure how South Africans feel, 
despite what other authors have referred to as obstacles in the nation building process (1999). 
 This study departs from the literature in national identity in South Africa in that it takes 
into account public opinion of national identity instead of relying on a theoretical framework to 
explain attachment to the nation. It also acknowledges that race is not ‗homogenous, bounded, 
and stable‖ (Erasmus 2010: 390) as it is often treated in empirical studies, while at the same time 
















South Africa‘s emergence as a democracy in 1994 has been referred to by some as the 
negotiated revolution of 1994. This was followed in 1996 by the adoption of a comprehensive 
constitution, granting citizens rights to housing, food, healthcare, education, social security, and 
outlawing discrimination in more than 15 categories. However, challenges to peace and stability 
still remain. Existing economic and social inequality continues to be experienced along racial 
lines. Despite government policies and programs that encourage social and racial integration, 
such as affirmative action policies in higher education and the workplace, South Africa continues 
to be an extremely divided society in terms of education, employment, and wealth (Van der Berg 
and Louw 2003: 11, 18; Banerjee et al. 2008: 733). Segregation in today's democratic South 
African society is affected by the racialized identities that stem from the apartheid era. 
 In 1948, the South African government, led by the National Party, undertook a systematic 
program that excluded a vast majority of the population from formal citizenship. In 1951, the 
Bantu Authorities Act restricted political participation for Black to the Bantustans. For the 
majority of the population, exclusion from formal citizenship continued until 1983, with a few 
reforms.  The Coloured Persons‘ Representative Council, established in 1964 and the South 
African Indian Council, established in 1968 allowed for limited political participation in ethnic 
affairs. The Constitution of 1983 allowed for a tricameral parliament with a House of Assembly 
for Whites, a House of Representatives for Coloureds, and a House of Delegates for Indians, 
although the House of Assembly had decisive influence on the outcome of legislative debates. 
The release of Nelson Mandela in 1990 and the talks that led to the 1994 election resulted in a 












democratized South Africa saw the emergence of inclusive citizenship, where all race groups 
were awarded formal citizenship and equal representation through universal suffrage. Yet, new 
institutions, bureaucracies, and policies were also devoted to including formally excluded 
populations.  
  
Public Policy and the Nation Building Agenda in South Africa 
 As the governing and dominant political party, the ANC has been the primary source of 
nation building policy in South Africa. Some argue that it is the ANC that set the nation building 
agenda (Bekker et al. 1999; Mattes 2011). The ANC has emphasized a non-ethnic South African 
nationalism, focusing on economic and social equity along with non-racialism (Barber 1994: 70). 
One of the most ambitious nation-building projects to date was reinventing South Africa‘s 
identity as a cohesive nation after apartheid. South Africa has taken many strides towards the 
realization of this goal, but continues to battle with the lingering effects of racial policy during 
apartheid. This chapter will identify nation-building policies, symbols and practices that have 
been used in cultivating a sense of national identity. 
In practical terms, the nation-building agenda in South Africa continues to be set by 
national policies of the ANC. Bekker notes that the ANC defined the political objectives for 
South Africa during the period leading up to the constitutional negotiations and the general 
elections. These objectives included a non-racial democratic nation-state, and this would be 
established by cultural homogenization (1999: 2). The ANC-dominated Constitutional Assembly 
resulted in a majoritarian, centralized system with very few effective checks on power (Mattes 












controls the government apparatus, and therefore the political objectives for the country, almost 
exclusively.  
As the victorious party in constitutional negotiations and dominant governing party since 
1994, the ANC‘s ideas on nation building have been the primary influence on government 
policy, effectively setting the agenda. By examining this agenda, we can analyze the effect that 
these policies, and the underlying assumptions that inform these policies, has had on national 
sentiment in South Africa. Before discussing the ANC‘s nation-building agenda, it is important 
to first describe the ANC‘s vision of the ‗nation‘. 
 
Conceptions of the nation prior to 1994 
 Since its birth in 1912, the ANC has endeavored to fight for African participation in 
representative institutions that were dominated by the white minority. In the 1940s, the ANC 
advocated the elimination of economic and legal barriers to African advancement, and after the 
beginning of Apartheid in 1948, advocated more forcefully for economic democracy (Johns and 
Davis 1991: 8). Since the inception of the ANC, economic rights have been central to the 
struggle and have informed what type of ―nation‖ South Africa should be. In this way, an 
economic and social democracy informed what the vision of the nation should be. Who would be 
included in the nation is a debate that came later.  
 The Freedom Charter of 1955 broadly outlined the ANC‘s goal for social democracy that 
remains central to the party‘s core beliefs (ibid). Despite contestation on whether the ANC 
should advocate an exclusively African nationalism or more inclusive, non-racial nationalism, 
the ANC chose the latter. According to the Freedom Charter, ―South Africa belongs to all who 












for an Africanist identity resulted in the Pan African Congress (PAC) splitting from the ANC in 
1959 (Johns and Davis 1991: 8). The ANC discourse of rights and equality are the cornerstone of 
nation-building policy in South Africa. Eventually, the ANC opened membership to non-
Africans in 1969, and then to the executive committee in 1985, although the ANC always 
maintained African leadership. This is a fundamental difference between ANC ideology and the 
other ―Africanist‖ ideologies of the PAC and Black Consciousness. Although the ANC 
recognized the history of colonialization and land dispossession, the ―rights discourse‖ of the 
ANC included whites as an integral part of the nation and defines legal citizenship as the 
determinant of ―belonging‖ to the nation (ibid: 181). 
 The Freedom Charter of 1955 broadly outlined the ANC‘s goal for social democracy that 
remains central to the party‘s core beliefs (ibid: 8). Despite contestation on whether the ANC 
should advocate an exclusively African nationalism or more inclusive, non-racial nationalism, 
the ANC chose the latter. The ANC maintained this core value despite challenges from the Pan 
African Congress (PAC) and the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) to advocate for an 
Africanist identity (ibid). Reddy identifies three main counter-discourses during the apartheid 
era: the ―rights discourse‖ of the ANC, the ―anti-colonial/psychological discourse‖ of the Pan 
Africanist Congress (PAC), and the ―class analysis discourse‖ of the South African Communist 
Party (SACP) (2000: 170). The ANC discourse of rights and equality are the cornerstone of 
nation-building policy in South Africa. Eventually, the ANC opened membership to non-
Africans in 1969, and then to the executive committee in 1985, although the ANC always 
maintained African leadership. This is a fundamental difference between ANC ideology and the 
other ―Africanist‖ ideologies of the PAC and Black Consciousness. Although the ANC 












ANC included whites as an integral part of the nation and defines legal citizenship as the 
determinant of ―belonging‖ to the nation (ibid: 181). 
The Freedom Charter called for a democratic state that granted equal rights and 
opportunities. Here we can see the beginnings of inclusive citizenship. Included in the idea of a 
democratic state was universal suffrage, ―equal status in the bodies of state, in the courts and in 
the schools for all national groups and races,‖ as well as the preservation of language and culture 
(ANC 1955). Beyond democratic participation, the Freedom Charter also laid the framework of 
what is core to ANC ideology, economic and social equity. The Freedom Charter made clear that 
economic wealth, in the form of mineral wealth and industry, as well as the freedom to enter 
trades should belongs to all South Africans. In order to facilitate this economic equity, the end of 
land ownership restrictions was also called for, in addition to the freedom of movement and the 
end of labor exploitation in the form of forced labor and farm prisons. This was crucial in order 
to realize the idea of an inclusive citizenship.  
Political equity, or equality before the law, was also stipulated through the demand for 
fair trials and imprisonment within the law. Welfare and labor rights were also highly 
emphasized in the stipulation that there should be freedom to form and join trade unions, access 
unemployment benefits, receive equal pay for equal work, and set a national minimum wage 
(ibid). The rights of the worker were central to ANC‘s Freedom Charter. The Charter also called 
for opening of the education system, and a respect for culture. There was also the demand for the 
freedom to be decently housed and have access to state healthcare. 
 The Freedom Charter clearly endorsed a mixed economy where state power would be 












lines during Apartheid (Johns and Davis 1991: 8). Addressing the political and economic 
inequalities of Apartheid was tantamount to building a new and democratic nation. 
 
ANC Nation-Building Agenda in South Africa after 1994 
 After 1994, the ANC maintained its commitment to non-racialism and sought to create a 
single citizenship and a broad ―shared sense of South Africanness‖ (ANC 1992). The ANC 
stated that the "national character" of the National Democratic Revolution is to reconcile the 
contradictions between the oppressed majority and their oppressors by creating a ―united, non-
racial, non-sexist and democratic society‖ (ANC 1997). Although the ANC placed an emphasis 
on the psychological element of national identity, and the importance of promoting the feeling of 
pride in being South African, they noted that ―the social psychological phenomenon on its own is 
not sustainable without socio-economic transformation‖
 
(ibid). This exemplifies a materialist 
understanding of the drivers of national identity. Rhetoric on nation-building included all aspects 
of inclusive citizenship, however, economic equity was more emphasized in the public policy 
realm. The ANC nation building program didn‘t give life to political freedoms beyond the rights 
awarded in the constitution. This continues to be the case as reflected in the ANC‘s 2009 
Election Manifesto states that ―the socio-economic challenges are closely bound with our task of 
nation building‖ (ANC 2009). 
Nation building during the Mandela and Mbeki years remained consistent, although 
Mandela focused more on social cohesion based around tolerance. He supported Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu‘s vision of a Rainbow Nation and consistently promoted the spirit of Ubuntu. 
Mbeki‘s ―I am an African‖ speech moved towards a homogenous notion of Africanism. By 












identity. Although his speech emphasized a homogenizing Africanist approach to identity, it 
remained inclusive, reaffirming that ―South Africa belongs to all who live in it‖ (Mbeki 1996).  
Mattes argues that in the quest to create legitimacy after 1994, the ANC concerned itself with 
a nation building project that endeavored to create a feeling of loyalty to the state (2011: 7). He 
argues that it was necessary to build an enduring and diffuse support that would not have to rely 
on the constant delivery of political and economic goods (ibid: 6-7). The ANC continues to 
address inclusive citizenship as a goal in fostering national identity and nation building 
(Govender 2010). However, the discourse of socio-economic transformation surrounding nation 
building policies makes it so that the delivery of economic goods cannot be divorced from the 
idea of what it means to be a nation.  
 
Policies and Programmes that Reflect the Nation Building Agenda 
Table 3.1 Key ANC Policies and Frameworks that Reflected a Nation-building Agenda  
Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) (1994) 
Economic development and poverty alleviation policy 
framework aimed at redressing inequalities of 
Apartheid 
Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) Strategy (1996) 
Neo-liberal economic strategy aimed in increasing the 
GDP, increasing employment, and redistributing 
income and socio-economic opportunities in favor of 
the poor 
Integrated National Disability Strategy (1997) 
Aimed to establish a system of monitoring to increase 
opportunities and prevent discrimination of those with 
disabilities 
Employment Equity Act (1998) 
Prohibits discrimination on grounds of race, gender, 
sexual orientation, HIV status, religion, language, and 
culture and implements affirmative action measures. 
National Policy Framework for Women Empowerment and Gender 
Equality (2000) 
General policy framework to guide gender equity in 
the 27 sectors, making the National Office on the 
Status of Women the center for this coordination 
The National Language Policy Framework (2002) 
Aimed at promoting language equity and the use of  
South Africa's official languages 
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act (BBBEE) (2003) 
Aimed at changing the racial composition of those 
who manage, own and control enterprises and 
productive assets. Expands goals of economic 
empowerment to include women, workers, youth, and 













 Given the ANC‘s materialist understanding of national identity, policies, such as the RDP 
and GEAR, which are developmental policies aimed at improving economic and social welfare 
can be categorized as nation building policies. Economic development policies not only have 
development goals, but also aim to redress inequalities of the past. In that way, these policy goals 
are also rights based, as they address the need for equal rights among South Africans, even in the 
economic realm.  
Policy goals associated with inclusive citizenship as rights based and equity based are 
reinforced by the ANC discourse of rights and equality. On one end of the spectrum, there is the 
Constitution, which enshrines the rights of all South Africans to participate in the democratic 
process and protects them from unjust treatment. On the other end are policies that aim to 
address social and economic inequality. Of course, in many ways, these goals cannot be divorced 
from each other, as the ANC discourse has maintained that it is a fundamental right of citizens to 
have equal access to freedom and goods. In other words, equity can be seen as a right.  
Nation-building efforts include policies aimed at correcting the inequalities of the past. 
These policies can be seen as both practical and symbolic. Separating these policies into rights-
based policies and equity policies helps to understand the framework established by ANC 
understandings of inclusive citizenship. Rights based policies include South Africa‘s inclusive 
language policy, discrimination policy, religious freedom policy, and other rights guaranteed in 
the Constitution. Equity policies are geared toward the economic advancement of previously 
disadvantaged segments of the population such as the Reconstruction and Development Program 
(RDP), the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, Broad-Based Black 












Framework for Women Empowerment and Gender Equality, the National Disability Strategy, 
and the Employment Equity Act. 
Several policies acknowledged loosely defined nation building as goals. The RDP 
focused on the economic equity aspect of the ANC‘s vision of what it meant to have and build a 
nation. Other policies did not directly state nation building as a policy objective, but had nation 
building as a subtext or underlying theme in the policy. Examples of this include affirmative 
action policies, GEAR, BEE and BBEE. 
 
The Symbols of Nation Building 
Another area of nation-building was expressed through the active promotion of state 
symbols, such as a new national flag, holidays, and place names, in addition to the development 
of museums, heritage sites, and the arts (Mattes 2011: 7-8). South Africa began the reinvention 
of its image when it became an independent nation in 1994. South Africa needed to reinvent its 
image to itself as well the greater international community. With independence, came a need 
create the symbols necessary to define an identity to South Africans and to the world.  
In the ANC document, Ready to Govern, the ANC acknowledged the role of arts and 
culture in forging national unity. The document called on the creation of a department to promote 
arts and culture, which today manifests itself in the Department of Arts and Culture. Public 
symbols and names were meant to represent the diversity of the whole population (ANC 1992). 
The South African Geographical Names Council (SAGNC) is charged with this responsibility 
(Department of Arts and Culture n.d.). One of the focuses of the Social Cluster in implementing 
the Government Programme of Action (POA) has been the promotion of national identity and 












flags in schools and embarking on an educational campaign on the importance of the flag 
(Tshablala-Msimang 2008). 
Many symbols express nation-building desires of the post-apartheid government. 
Symbols include the multi-colored flag, national anthem, coat of arms, pledge of allegiance, and 
renaming of cities, towns, and streets. Examining the choice of national symbols in post-
apartheid South Africa is a natural first step to understanding the tools used to create, present, 
and reinforce South Africa‘s national identity.  In line with the notion of inclusive citizenship, 
South Africa adopted the motto ―Unity in Diversity‖ (!ke e:/xarra//ke) in 2000. The motto, !ke 
e:/xarra//ke, is written in the Khoisan language and means ‗diverse people unite.‘ This motto is a 
strong departure from the motto of the previous coat of arms, utilized from 1932 to 2000, which, 
written in Latin, says ‗Unity is Strength.‘  
 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission also formed a powerful symbol of national 
healing and nation building. Established by the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation 
Act, No. 34 of 1995, the TRC was carried out under the auspices of the Government of National 
Unity, which included the ANC and the National Party. South Africa‘s reconciliation process 
informed the intent to define a national identity as a common and non-racial identity. It was 
established to investigate political crimes during apartheid and heal the nation by providing 
platforms for dialogue on these crimes. Archbishop Desmond Tutu served as the chairman of the 
commission and often spoke of the healing process the commission would allow South Africans. 
The aim of the commission was to ―promote reconciliation in South Africa's divided society 
through truth about its dark past‖ (Barrow 1998).  
The Rainbow Nation campaign and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission greatly 












Archbishop Desmond Tutu to describe South Africa after 1994, the concept of the Rainbow 
Nation was used in Mandela‘s inauguration speech to denote the unification of a multicultural 
South Africa.  Some say that the Commission‘s success owes much to the media coverage of the 
reconciliation process (Verdoolaege 2005: 186). ―The Commission listened to personal 
narratives of apartheid victims, considered applications for amnesty by apartheid perpetrators, 
recommended reparations for survivors of apartheid, and was thus charged with archiving South 
Africa's collective memory of the past‖ (ibid: 182). Media coverage of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission brought the hearings into people‘s homes for two years. The South 
African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) was crucial in communicating the message of 
national unity (Baines 1998). For those who had television, every Sunday, the TRC Special 
Report was broadcast and summed up the hearings of the previous week. This aggressive media 
campaign left an indelible mark on the collective memory of South Africans and informed South 
Africa‘s developing national identity.  
  
The Policies of Nation Building 
 
 The Constitution is the preeminent authority on the rights and freedoms awarded to the 
South African populace. The Bill of Rights stipulated that all are equal before the law. All South 
Africans have the right to freedoms of religion, expression, assembly, association, movement, 
trade, adequate housing, a basic education, language use and cultural life. In addition, all citizens 
have the right to vote, join political parties, and access healthcare, sufficient food and water, and 
social security and the courts (RSA Constitution 1996a). 
 Several policies were put in place in order to carry out some of these goals. Many rights 












protection of cultural diversity. The National Language Policy Framework is one such 
commitment. The framework acknowledges the linguistic diversity of South Africa and 
encourages the use of indigenous languages to ―foster and promote national unity.‖ (DAC 2003: 
1.1.7). In addition, the policy refers to the principle of promoting ―language equity and language 
rights,‖ as required for democracy (ibid: 2.2.1).  
The Employment Equity Act of 1998 seeks to eliminate unfair discrimination in the work 
place by prohibiting the discrimination on many grounds, including race, gender, sexual 
orientation, HIV status, religion, language, and culture. It also provides a framework for 
affirmative action in order to diversify the workplace and eliminate employment barriers (RSA 
Employment Equity Act 1998). Likewise, empowerment policies such as the National Policy 
Framework for Women Empowerment and Gender Equality of 2000, and the National Disability 
Strategy were put in place to further equality. 
 The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) lays the groundwork for equity 
based nation building in South Africa. Section 1.3.5 cites the divisions and inequalities left by 
apartheid as the central crisis to nation building (RSA 1994). The document states that nation 
building must ―link reconstruction and development‖ which is predicated on the democratization 
of South Africa (ibid: 1.3.6). In the RDP, nation building and development go hand in hand. 
Further, it was hoped that the RDP would create the material basis for nation building since the 
ANC saw eliminating the wide economic and social gap as a prerequisite to nation building 
(Mattes 2011: 8). ―In other words, the implementation of the RDP is an essential part of 
addressing the national question‖ (ANC 1997). 
The Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy did not mention nation 












goals of the RDP (RSA 1996b: 1.1). It sought to create an environment for rapid growth and 
rapid service delivery based on universal access. Rapid job growth, job creation, and 
development were the goals that fell in line with implementing the RDP (ibid: 9). It is clear that 
realizing a democratic South Africa required a sound economic base and equal access to 
economic goods.  
Service delivery policies, such as housing and water delivery, health care delivery, and 
education, serve as developmental policies aimed at providing universal access to goods and 
services. In terms of inclusive citizenship, this is most reflected in the ANC‘s strategies to 
facilitate people‘s access to welfare. Such policies attempt to realize the nation building goals of 
the ANC.  
Putting the above goals into practice, the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment 
(BBBEE) Act of 2003, provided a policy implementation strategy to carry out some of the RDP 
and GEAR‘s goals of creating employment and redressing the injustices of the past. Those who 
were classified under apartheid as Black, Coloured, or Indian were broadly referred to as 
―Black.‖ The stated goals of the policies were to increase the number of ―Black people‖ that 
manage, own and control enterprises and productive assets. Preferential procurement and 
changing the racial composition of ownership were steps to promote ―economic transformation 
in order to enable meaningful participation of black people in the economy‖ (RSA 2003: 2). 
BBBEE also addressed gender and social inequality by gearing economic empowerment to all 
















The continued use of racial categorizations in affirmative action policies and in state 
administration, such as the census, is in direct conflict with the unifying discourse on nation 
building and non-racialism.
16
 The ANC constantly defends the use of apartheid categorizations 
in affirmative action policies, arguing that there is no way to measure the progress of social and 
economic equity policies if these categories are not maintained (Nongena 2007). According to 
the ANC, these categories are seen as an evil, but a necessary evil that responds to the history of 
inequality and the need to redress the injustices of the past.  However, the ANC has long 
recognized the racial differentiation of the South African population. The ANC charter refers to 
four ―national groups,‖ African, White, Coloured, and Indian, which Neville Alexander, who 
remains critical of the use of apartheid categories, labels as the ―four nation thesis‖ (Reddy 2000: 
182). In fact, as Maré points out, even the discussion of ―non-racialism‖ implicitly accepts there 
are four ‗races‘ and therefore serves to reify race (1999: 247).   
Examining the intentions of public policies aimed at nation building would not be 
sufficient to measure the relative successes and failures of the South African government‘s 
attempts to forge a unified national identity. As such, it is important to examine public opinion to 
understand the successes and failures of the nation building project. South Africa‘s peaceful 
transition to democracy has provided the country with stability and security. It has lead to 
increased foreign investment, tourism, greater social integration, rising employment, and 
improved standard of living for all citizens. There remains, however, gross disparities among 
income, employment, literacy, and HIV/AIDS rate, indicating that South Africa‘s past is far from 
reconciled. 
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 See Moodley and Adam (2000 for a discussion on the tensions between colour blindness and the need to 












 Nation building policy in South Africa rests on the ideas of inclusive citizenship, which 
heavily emphasize political and economic equality. It is evident that rights and equity are core to 
the ANC understanding of nation building. However, there are also contradictions which are 
embodied in affirmative action policies that discriminate along racial lines in order to promote 
equality, thus reifying race in what should be a ―non-racial‖ society. 
As stated before, nation-branding can‘t move beyond existing social realities. In order to 
exhibit South African society as a Rainbow Nation, with principles based on democracy and 
equality, reality would have to closely follow through continued policy reforms. The ANC has 
demonstrated a nation-building agenda that has informed a broad policy framework which 
provides the reasoning behind, or perhaps the justification to, several developmental policies. 
The principles of nation-building though rights and economic equity is one of the long term 















THEORETICAL CONCEPT FORMATION AND RESEARCH METHODS 
 
Conceptions of the ‘Nation’ 
 
From a constructivist standpoint, the nation is an ―imagined political community‖ 
(Anderson 1983: 6). Hobsbawm argues that nations are based on the invention of tradition (1983: 
1). He discusses the invention of symbols and tradition as a powerful means to an end, such as 
the legitimization of state power or social cohesion, such as patriotism. Such traditions are 
attempts to establish continuity with a suitable historic past. Although nationalism uses aspects 
of pre-existing cultures, it often transforms them, giving them new meanings (Gellner 1983: 55). 
Smith argues that myths, memories, traditions, and symbols are central to modern national 
identities (1999: 9). The reproduction of symbols in everyday, routine life serves to reinforce a 
nation‘s invented history, in what Michael Billig refers to as ―banal nationalism‖ (1995: 8). 
Underlying the empirical literature, as found in the literature on xenophobia and democracy 
is a one-dimensional definition of national identity, that of the individual relating to the nation 
(Crush and Pendleton 2004; Crush 2008; Mattes: 2002a; Mattes 2002b; Mattes 2004; Robinson 
2009). Missing is the second aspect of national identity, the relationship of the individual to others 
within the nation. As Anthony Smith finds, members should feel an intense bond of solidarity 
towards the nation and other members (Emphasis original, Smith 2001: 26). Conceptually, this is 
easily understood when relating it to the concepts of vertical and horizontal citizenship. Vertical 
citizenship is defined by identification with the polity. Horizontal citizenship is defined by 
identification with the community (Kabeer 2005: 23). The crucial factors in national identity are 












the group. Keeping this in mind, conceptions of vertical and horizontal relationships of national 
identity are crucial in understanding the levels national identity in South Africa.  
 
Measuring National Identity 
 
 Although qualitative analyses of national identity tackle the multiple dimensions of identity 
(Erasmus and Pieterse 1999; Marais 2001; Maré:1999), there have not been any empirical studies 
that examine national identity as a twofold concept, as not only relating or having bonds to the 
nation, but also relating and having bonds with others within the nation. Studies, for the most part, 
have focused on vertical relationships of national identity possibly because a lack of conceptual 
understanding, but definitely because of a lack of data. 
 Idasa surveys, conducted in 1995, 1997, and 1998, and Afrobarometer surveys, conducted 
in 2000, 2002, 2004, 2005, and 2008, ask several questions relating to the individual‘s sense of 
national identity. Questions ask whether the respondent thinks that being a South African is an 
important part of how they see themselves, whether they want their children to see themselves as 
South African, and whether they are proud to be South African all measure varying attachments 
to the nation. They do not, however, measure attachments to others in the national community.
17
 
Crush and Pendleton analyze the above questions from a South African Migration Project 
(SAMP) survey conducted in 1999 and report that over 90% of respondents responded to these 
questions with either ―agree‖ or ―strongly agree‖ (Crush and Pendleton 2004: 29-30). These 
questions measure levels of vertical national identity. Although this seems to be an indication of 
a strong national identity, the nation in question is not defined. We have no evidence to suggest 
the contents of that national imagining are or whether citizens are imagining the same type of 
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 The 1997 Idasa survey does ask: ―Are there any groups living in this country who you think should not 












nation. In the same study, respondents were asked whether they feel strong ties with people who 
call themselves South Africans and only 68% agreed or strongly agreed (ibid: 31).  
 In another SAMP study, Crush reports from the 2006 SAMP Xenophobia Survey that 
when asked: ―In South Africa, it is clear that citizens of all races and religions share a common 
culture,‖ less than 50% agreed or strongly agreed. (Crush 2008: 23). These questions measure 
levels of horizontal national identity. These findings mark a significant drop compared to 
questions asking about one‘s pride in being South African, where over 80% of South Africans 
felt proud to be South African. It can be argued that members of a nation share a common 
national culture. By phrasing the question to include all races and religions, the question implies 
a more inclusive culture that accepts diversity, however, the exact wording of the questions does 
not specifically refer to a common national culture. The question from the 2005 SAMP report 
referring to strong ties with other South Africans is a better proxy for horizontal national identity, 
i.e. attachment to others within the nation. 
This indicates that national identity in South Africa has been mismeasured. If the nation is 
made up of an imagined community, as Anderson puts it, the difference in responses indicates 
that South Africans may not be imagining the same type of nation or relating to other members 
within the nation. It is not clear who is and who is not deemed to fit in the nation.
18
 Not sharing a 
common understanding of what the community means results in an attachment to the nation that 
only relies on the relationship between in individual and the nation, and not to the community, 
which makes national unity impossible. This denotes the need for an improved conceptual 
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 The exception is a question from the IDASA 1997 survey which specifically asks whether there are groups living 
in South Africa who should not be a part of the South African nation. 22.3% of the population identified a group 
who should not be part of the nation. Unfortunately, this question was only asked in 1997, so an analysis of these 
responses over time is not possible. It does, however, give an indication that the horizontal aspect of national 
identity is not being addressed. A more accurate measure is the SAMP survey question: ―it is clear that citizens of all 












framework for national identity. The measurement of national identity needs to be corrected to 
adequately encompass the concept of national identity as vertical and horizontal. These data 
limitations preclude this study from measuring horizontal national identity. (See discussion of data 
















 National identity is the dependent variable. I conceptualize national identity as multi-
dimensional, with facets of vertical and horizontal identities. This paper will be limited to 
measuring and analysing levels of vertical national identity. My research seeks to expand the 
current literature on national identity by identifying factors that influence levels of national 
identity. See Table 1 for a conceptualization of inclusive citizenship and a list of dependent and 
independent variables. I also report findings from reliability analysis and factor analysis for all 


























 Scholars have often cited gross inequalities as a hindrance to nation-building in South 
Africa (Croucher 1998), leading one to expect perceived economic status as a factor in 
determining levels of national identity. Age may also be a determining factor, with a distinction 
between those born or raised under apartheid and those born or raised after.  
 The ANC nation-building discourse during and after apartheid has stressed inclusive 
citizenship. One could expect that national identity during apartheid correlated with the degree of 
citizenship. Under apartheid, the Asians and Coloureds were grouped in the same category, with 
partial citizenship, while Whites had full citizenship and Blacks no citizenship. One could expect 
that Whites, who had full citizenship rights during Apartheid, would have stronger levels of 
national identity than Coloureds and Asians, who had partial citizenships rights, and that 
Coloureds would have stronger levels of national identity than Blacks, who had no citizenship 
rights. One could also expect that levels of national identity rose for Coloureds and Blacks after 
the end of apartheid, although this is not able to be tested with Afrobarometer data. Alternatively, 
because of the ANC-led National Democratic Revolution and consequent ANC-led government, 
one could also imagine that Whites would feel excluded in the new regime, unless of course they 
identified with the ANC, and subsequently would not feel a part of the new South African nation. 
In either case, it is suspected that national identity levels will differ by race and partisanship. 
 Since South Africa‘s rights-based constitution and equity-based public policies are aimed 
at redressing the injustices and inequalities of the past, one would expect that these policies have 
an effect on South African national identity. If this is true, those who perceive that they are 
















Race as a moderating variable 
 
 When looking at the effect of ideas of inclusive citizenship on national identity in South 
Africa, I also examine whether race has a moderating effect on other variables. Because citizenship 
rights during apartheid were awarded on the bases of racial differences, it is suspected that the 
elements on inclusive citizenship would have differing effects on national identity based on race. 
For example, perceptions of political freedom may be more important to a person‘s level of national 
identity if their race group were denied this freedom during apartheid. I examine this by first testing 
for the effect of the perceptions of inclusive citizenship on national identity with an ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression model on all South Africans. Then I run a second regression controlling 
for race by adding a dummy variables. The third regression model adds the interaction variables of 
race and elements of inclusive citizenship These three regression models are run for years 2002, 
2004, 2005, and 2008.  
  This method provides a better understanding of how race moderates the effect of inclusive 
citizenship on national identity. It allows us to see whether perceptions of political freedom and 
economic conditions inform national identity differently across race groups. Utilizing interaction 
variables allows the study to tap into the lingering effects of racial classification during apartheid on 




 I use micro level analysis of public opinion surveys. The unit of analysis the individual 
respondent. Where possible, I use a longitudinal design. I use data from 5 rounds of Afrobarometer 
and 2 rounds from IDASA in order to track levels of vertical national identity over time from 1995 












responses on questions relating to national identification. The dependent variable is a created 
index of national identity. 
 
VARIABLES IN THE ANALYSIS 
 The following table lists all indicators used in the linear regression. Where possible, I 
used multi-item indices. Factor analysis and reliability analysis (Cronbach‘s alpha) were used to 
establish validity, which are also reported in Appendix D. I applied the most stringent methods 
of maximum-likelihood extraction and direct oblimin rotation. Reliability and factor analysis 
statistics are reported to establish accuracy of indices, however means were computed in order to 
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 Wording on 2002 compares the present system of government with the former system of Apartheid rule. 
20
 Wording on 2008 survey refers specifically to Mbeki government. 
21
 Coded ANC if respondent chose African National Congress. 
22
 Coded Opposition if respondent chose African Muslim Party (AMP), African Christian Democratic Party 
(ACDP), Afrikanker Unity Movement, Alliance of Free Democrats, Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO), 
Christian Party, Democratic Alliance-Democratic Party (DA-DP), Federal Alliance, Federal Democrats, Freedom 
Front, Inkata Freedom Party, Minority Front, National Democratic Convention (NADECO), New National Party 
(NNP), Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), United Christian Democratic Party (UDCP), United Democratic Movement 
(UDM), Independent Democrats (ID), United Independent Front, ANC Breakaway Party / new Lekota or George or 
Shilowa Party or Movement / National Conference Party or Movement, or Other. 
Table 4.1: Variables in the Analysis 
Concept  Survey Item(s) 
ational Identity Index It makes you proud to be called a South African. 
  You would want your children to think of themselves as South African. 
  Being South African is a very important part of how you see yourself. 
Political Freedom
19
 Index Please tell me if the following things are worse or better now than they were a 
few years ago, or are they about the same: Freedom to say what you think? 
  Freedom to join any political organization you want? 
  Freedom to choose who to vote for without feeling pressured? 
Equality before the Law Item In this country, how often: Are people treated unequally under the law? 
Economic Equity Item How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the 
following matters, or haven‘t you heard enough about them to say: Narrowing 
gaps between rich and poor?
 20
 
 Item In general, how do you rate: Your living conditions compared to those of other 
South Africans? 
Lived Poverty Index Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or your family gone without: 
Enough food to eat? 
  Enough clean water for home use? 
  Medicines or medical treatment? 
  Enough fuel to cook your food?  
  A cash income? 
  Electricity in your home? 
Present Economic 
Conditions  
Index Looking back, how do you rate the following compared to twelve months ago: 
Economic conditions in this country? 
  Your living conditions? 
  In general, how would you describe: The present economic conditions of this 
country? 
  Your own present living conditions? 
Future Economic 
Conditions 
Construct Looking ahead, do you expect the following to be better or worse: Economic 
conditions in this country in twelve months time? 
  Your living conditions in twelve months time? 
News Media Item How often do you get news from the following sources? Newspapers 
 Item Television? 
 Item Radio? 
ANC  Do you feel close to any particular political party? If so, which party is that?
21
  
Opposition  Do you feel close to any particular political party? If so, which party is that?
22
  
Youth  Item Youth is calculated as 16 years or older in 1990 
Control Variables   
Age Item How old were you at your last birthday? 
Education Item What is the highest level of education you have completed?   
Urban Item Do you come from a rural or urban area? (Answered by interviewer) 
Gender Item Respondent‘s gender (Answered by interviewer) 












When deciding how to best operationalize perceptions of economic performance, I first 
sought to group variables about past, present, and future perceptions of economic performance 
by country and individual. I sought to have one index for perceptions of personal economic 
conditions and an alternate index for perceptions of country level economic conditions.  
However, a correlation matrix reveals that perceptions of individual living conditions are highly 
correlated to perceptions of country economic conditions for a given time frame, meaning that 
citizens aligned their perceived individual economic performance with their perceived economic 
performance of the nation for the years in the analysis (See factor loadings in Appendix D). 
Reliability analyses confirm that categorizing perceptions of economic conditions temporally is 
more appropriate. I also grouped perceptions of current economic conditions and conditions 
compared to one year ago in the variable ‗present economic conditions.‘ Both measure 
perceptions of economic condition in the present, one perception simply relates to conditions in 
the present. The other relates to present conditions relative to the past year. Both capture the 
perception of current economic conditions.  
To keep the regression model parsimonious, it would have been ideal to create an index 
of news consumption. However, newspaper, radio and television media are included as separate 
independent variables rather than one independent variable of a news media consumption index. 
Factor analysis and reliability analyses confirm that the three items are not highly correlated. 
Newspaper media has more breadth and depth than television news, and is more likely to contain 
investigative journalism. Television news, on the other hand, is limited in content and in number. 
SABC and ETV are the only local providers in South Africa with news programming and lacks 
investigative reporting. Radio news can be seen as a middle ground for news coverage. Although 












relevant issues in depth. It is also the most immediate source of news, able to report events 
immediately, or soon after it occurs, and is the most accessible to the population. Radios are less 
expensive than televisions, they do not require literacy as newspapers do, and there is public 
broadcasting in the 11 official languages in addition to community radio stations.  
 
Data Limitations 
 Afrobarometer asks several questions relating to the individual‘s sense of vertical national 
identity. Questions asking whether the respondent thinks that being a South African is an 
important part of how they see themselves, whether they want their children to see themselves as 
South African, and whether they are proud to be South African all measure varying attachments 
to the nation. Afrobarometer document responses to the abovementioned questions on a five point 
scale that ranges from Strongly Disagree to Strong Agree. They do not, however, measure 
attachments to others in the national community. Findings from previous reports on xenophobia 
indicate that there are lower levels of horizontal national identity than vertical national identity 
(Crush and Pendleton 2004: 23).
 
This would indicate that the national identity in South Africa is 
not as strong as it appears in studies that have only measured vertical notions of national identity. 
There is a lack of indicators for horizontal national identity in Afrobarometer, Idasa, and 
World Values Survey, another survey that asks questions relating to national identity. There is 
also a lack of longitudinal data, making it difficult to compare levels of national identity before 
and after 1994. Idasa and Afrobarometer surveys, which offer the greatest number and most 
appropriate measures, only date back to 1995. The World Values Survey dates back to 1980, 
however the measures of national identity are limited in scope and the representation of the black 












the tribal areas, the sampling of the black population was limited to those living in the urban 
areas.   
There are several limitations to using public opinion surveys. The obvious example is the 
disparity between the subject‘s response and the subject‘s true feelings. Often the subject may be 
embarrassed to tell the truth to the enumerator, especially if their feelings are considered 
shameful in the public eye. Also, surveys of this nature cover many areas of study. 
Afrobarometer surveys collect data on individual attitudes on many topics, including democracy, 
participation, governance, and markets. A survey that is focused exclusively on national identity 
would be ideal because it would provide for more opportunity for open ended questions and 
focused questions that address the many aspects of national identity, including vertical and 























This chapter will address the first research question: what are the current levels of 
national identity in South Africa and how have they changed over time? The following chapter 
will address in what way elements of inclusive citizenship affect national identity and test for 
racial effects. This chapter analyzes trends in levels of national identity in South Africa by tracking 
responses to questions of national identity from 1995 to 2008.  
As stated earlier, I expect there to be a relationship with time, and that national identity 
would increase in South Africa as citizens are habituated to the new symbols, myths, and 
memories of the nation. As time passes, South Africans would feel more connected to the nation. 
This could be the result of several reasons. South Africans could undergo an attitude shift, where 
they grow to feel an attachment to the new nation if they did not feel before. A younger 
generation, with little cognitive awareness of the previous regime and exposure to a new 
curriculum, would feel a strong sense of national identity. Also, the passing of time means the 
passing of older generations who experienced both regimes and may feel an attachment to the 
past. Finally, I expect that the attachment to the nation will not be uniform across race. 
Table 5.1 shows indicators for national identity found in survey data from Idasa and 
Afrobarometer.
23
 By tabulating responses of ―Agree‖ and ―Strongly Agree‖ to the questions ―It 
makes you proud to be called South African,‖ ―You want your children to think of themselves as 
South African,‖ and ―Being South African is an important part of how I see myself,‖ we can see that 
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 ―Don‘t Knows‖ were recoded into the middle value of ―Neither Agree nor Disagree.‖ For Idasa 1995 data, the 
response options are ―Very Proud,‖ ―Proud,‖ ―Not Very Proud,‖ and ― Not at all Proud.‖ In this case,  a middle 












South Africans have a strong sense of national identity with a slight decline over time and variations 
in race. 
In contrast to my hypothesis, South Africans, as a whole, are less proud to be South Africans 
in 2008 than they were in 1997, moving down 7 percentage points. Whites showed the most 















When isolating by race, we see that black South Africans generally have higher levels of 
national identity than others. Since 1995, levels of national identity had generally been declining, 
with a slight peak in 2005, and then another decline in 2008. 
Table 5.1: Strength of National Identity           
South Africa 1995 - 2008            
  1995 1997 1998 2000 2002 2004 2005 2008   
Proud to be called South African             
Black 93 95 95 94 90 82 90 85   
White 86 85 73 74 85 80 78 68   
Coloured 92 94 95 87 89 88 88 87   
South Asian 91 89 84 84 70 83 95 80   
Total 92 94 91 90 88 82 89 83   
                    
I want my children to think of themselves as South African     
Black N/A N/A 94 92 89 82 91 84   
White N/A N/A 77 75 81 81 78 68   
Coloured N/A N/A 96 93 88 91 90 87   
South Asian N/A N/A 89 84 70 87 96 80   
Total N/A N/A 92 89 86 83 89 82   
                    
Being South African is a very important part of how I see myself   
Black N/A 91 93 91 86 82 88 82   
White N/A 85 73 75 80 80 75 70   
Coloured N/A 93 95 89 84 91 86 84   
South Asian N/A 87 84 80 67 76 94 84   
Total N/A 90 90 89 84 82 86 81   
                    
Source: Idasa 1995, 1997, 1998 Afrobarometer: 2000, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2008    
Note: Percentages of total respondents in each survey period that 
selected "Agree" or "Strongly Agree."          












Figures 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 show responses to each questions over time, disaggregated by race. 
Black South Africans are most likely to be proud to be called South Africans (Figure 5.1). Among 
those who want their children to think of themselves as South African, Coloured South Africans 
have displayed the highest levels of any race group over time (Figure 5.2). The importance of being 






























































































































 Each question showed similarities in trends that would indicate the questions to be 
measuring the same underlying concept of national identity. To simplify further analysis, I created 
an index of national identity with variable information from the responses to the above three 
questions for years 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2008. The index is on a five-point scale, 
from zero to four, with four indicating the highest sense of national identity. The scale mirrors the 
response categories found in the survey. ―Strongly disagree‖ is equal to zero; ―Disagree‖ is equal 
to one; ―Neither‖ is equal to two; ―Agree‖ is equal to three; and ―Strongly Agree‖ is equal to four. 
A factor analysis for each year, with factor loadings are large and similar, indicates that these items 
are measuring a single underlying concept of national identity (see APPENDIX A). A reliability 
analysis for each year confirms that a single index of these variables is appropriate.
24
  
 Figure 5.4 shows that South Africans score high on the national identity index. The trend 
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 Reliability analysis for the three questions reported the following Cronbach‘s Alphas: Idasa 1998: .827 , AB 2000: 













 The three questions: ―It makes you proud to be South African,‖ ―You want your children to 
think of themselves as South African,‖ and ―Being South African is an important part of how I see 
myself‖ are only available for years 1998 to 2008. All three questions were not asked in 1995 and 
1997. To illustrate levels of national identity for the 1995 and 1997 survey years, I graphed the 
mean scores of the pride question with the means of the index over time. The mean responses for 
the question, ―It makes you proud to be South African,‖ are almost identical to the means of the 
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 Disaggregating by race, we see that the mean index score for black South Africans is 
higher than the national average on the scale of national identity. Whites score the lowest on the 
index. All races show a trend downwards, except for South Asians. The trend line in Figure 5.7 





































 Two other metrics that also speak to national identity are questions that measure whether 
South Africans desire a united South African nation and whether they think such a nation is 
possible. Instead of asking about the respondents‘ attachment to the nation, these questions ask 
respondents about their vision of the nation and whether it includes ‗the other‘. The desire to create 
a united South African nation out of different groups comments on the respondents‘ inclusivity and 
desired content of the nation. The possibility of creating such a united nation comments on the 
perception of the future nation. Unfortunately no questions in the Afrobarometer survey ask 
whether the respondent feels that such a united South African nation already exists.  
 Table 5.2 shows a steady increase in the desire to create a united South Africa and the 
possibility of doing so until a decline in 2008. For every year, and every race, more South Africans 
desire a united nation than think it is possible. 
Table 5.2: Perceptions of the Nation             
South Africa 1997 - 2008               
  1997 1998 2000 2002 2004 2005 2008     
It is desirable to create one united South African nation out of all the different groups who live in this county   
Black 86 89 88 85 80 84 75     
White 58 66 63 71 67 77 72     
Coloured 94 91 95 72 88 86 83     
South Asian 88 91 95 69 81 96 86     
Total 83 86 85 80 80 84 76     
                    
It is possible to create such a united South African nation.           
Black 72 82 82 81 79 78 69     
White 32 41 45 57 54 59 58     
Coloured 70 78 84 71 71 76 77     
South Asian 72 69 78 64 79 93 80     
Total 67 75 77 75 75 76 69     
Source: Idasa 1997, 1998 Afrobarometer: 2000, 2004, 2006, 2008         
Note: Percentages of total respondents in each survey period that 























 The percentage of people who think that it‘s possible to create one united South Africa 
range from 16 to 5 percentage points lower than those who think it‘s desirable. The greatest gap 
between respondents who desire a united South Africa and those who think it‘s possible occurred 
in 1997, with a 16 point difference. The points almost converge in 2004, with 85% of South 
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Isolating by race, we can see in Figures 5.8 and 5.9 that White South Africans had the least 
desire in creating a united South Africa and the least faith in its possibility in 1997. However, there 
is a steady increase in both, and White South Africans show the largest increase over time in the 
desire and perception of the possibility to create a united South Africa. Other race groups have 
declined in their desire to create a united South Africa.  
Black and Coloured South Africans show a steady decline over time in the desire to create a 
united South Africa with a net decrease of 11 percentage points from 1997 to 2008 (Figure 5.11). 
South Asians show a very slight decline. White South Africans show the largest increase over time 























































Black South Africans are the only group with a decline in the possibility to create a united 
South Africa, although this is a slight net decrease of 3 percentage points. Coloured South Africans 
have increased their faith in the possibility only slightly over time (Figure 5.13).
Figure 5.11: 



























































On the other hand, White South Africans show the greatest increase in the belief that a 
united South Africa is possible, with a net increase of 26 percentage points, although they remain 
the least convinced of all the races, with only 58% in 2008 believing that it is a united South Africa 
is possible. A trend line also shows that belief in the possibility of a united South Africa is 
increasing for South Asians over time (Figure 5.14). 
 If 81% of the population feel that being South African is an important part of how they 
see themselves, but only 76% desire to create a united South African nation, and even fewer 
(69%) think that is it possible to created a united South African nation, that begs the question – 
what type of nation are they imagining? Who is in this imagined community and who is not? It‘s 
clear that on the individual level, South African feel themselves a part of the nation. What is not 
clear is who else belongs in this political community, in other words, who belongs in the nation. 
These results give us a glimpse that South Africans do not have as high a sense of communal 













would indicate. Although South Africans have a strong personal attachment to the nation, it is 
not matched with a willingness to extend nationhood to other South African citizens. Juxtaposed 
with the realties of growing inequality and poor race relations (Roefs 2006: 93), it is clear that 
although  South Africans are imaging themselves as part of the nation, the second and perhaps 
more crucial aspect of national identity, the horizontal aspect of identifying with others in the 
nation, is lacking. It is also suggests that the survey questions that speak to national identity-
pride in the nation, wanting one‘s children to identify with the nation, and the nation being an 













Perceptions of Inclusive Citizenship 
 Before analyzing the effect of inclusive citizenship on national identity, it is first useful to 
understand how South Africans have viewed the state of political freedoms, equality before the 
Figure 5.14: 


































law, economic conditions, and economic equity. The following figures graph the mean scores on 































































































































Perceptions of How the Government is 

















All these indicators show the mean score for each race and year. Overall, we can see that 
South Africans rate political freedoms the highest out of the indicators of inclusive citizenship. 
However, it is important to note that there has been a steady decline in how politically free South 
Africans feels themselves to be.  
Perceptions about how the government is handing economic inequality fare the worst. 
South Africans are very dissatisfied with the way the government is handling the gap between 
the rich and poor, although there is a very slight improvement over the years.  
Although the perception of current economic conditions has varied over the years, in 
2008, it dropped to its lowest levels over the four years, indicating that South Africans are not 
satisfied with the current state of the country‘s economy and their own living conditions. This is 
juxtaposed with higher means for the perception of future economic conditions. Overall, South 
Africans are more optimistic about their future economic conditions than their present. Only for 
Whites and South Asians did the perception of future conditions mirror the perception of current 
conditions.  
South Africans‘ perception equality under the law also ranked low, with a decline over 
the years. This indicates that South Africans are not satisfied with current state of justice. Of all 
the indicators of inclusive citizenship, the perception of political freedoms is the indicator that 
South Africans are satisfied with, although it barely reaches that mark. The other aspects of 
inclusive citizenship- economic equity, equality under the law, and present economic conditions- 
by 2008, all have mean scores below 2, meaning that South Africans are not satisfied with the 
state of these citizenship goods. Despite this, South Africans remain optimistic about their 












when comparing to previous years, South Africans are less optimistic about what the economic 
situation the future will be. 
 There is not much variation by race, with the exception of the perception of economic 
conditions in the future. Blacks and Coloureds are the most optimistic about their economic 
conditions in the future. On the other hand, the perception of future economic conditions for 
Whites and Coloureds are very much reflective of their current economic conditions, with very 
little increase, if any, between their perceptions of their current economic well-being with their 
perceptions of their future economic well-being. 
 When examining national identity over time, we see the levels of attachment to the nation 
decreasing rather than increasing as expected. There are variations among race, as expected, but 
all races, with the exception of South Asians, have decreasing levels of national identity over 
time. In so far as the ANC has realized the goals of inclusive citizenship, there is an overall 
dissatisfaction with economic equity, present economic conditions, and equality under the law. 
Further, South Africans are barely satisfied with the state of their political freedoms. The 
following chapter will test for the relationship between these elements of inclusive citizenship 
and national identity to understand how important these deliverables are to a sense of South 












ANATYTICAL STATISTICS & HYPOTHESIS TESTING  
 The previous chapter demonstrated that South Africans, in general, have high levels of 
national identity although this has been in decline over the last ten years. Only South Asians 
showed a slight net increase in the national identity index over time. In order to address what 
informs this vertical sense of national identity, the following regressions will identify the 
relationships between elements of the ANC nation building program of inclusive citizenship and 
the dependent variable national identity.   
 Utilizing three separate Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions allows for testing the 
relationship between the independent variables that are believed to comprise the concept of 
inclusive citizenship and national identity, the dependent variable in question.  OLS regression 
assumes a linear relationship between the independent and dependent variables. All independent 
variables that measure aspects of inclusive citizenship are on a continuous scale, making OLS 
regression an appropriate and easily understood method to use in determining the relationship 
between inclusive citizenship and national identity. Party affiliation, gender, age, urban/rural 
location, and race are treated as binary variables and therefore also appropriate in an OLS 
regression. OLS regressions allow us to ascertain the strength, direction, and statistical 
significance of any independent variables while holding other independent variables constant.  
 Examining the unstandardized Beta coefficients allows one to see the unique contribution 
of each independent variable in the prediction of the dependent variable. It can be considered a 
raw score, and is especially useful when comparing the effect of independent variables across 
years. However, the values of the Beta coefficients depend on the range of the independent 












independent variable on the dependent variable, the standardized Beta is especially useful. 
Because the Beta coefficients are standardized, it allows one to compare the relative 
contributions of each independent variable on the dependent variable within the same model. 
 ANC nation-building discourse in South Africa has emphasized inclusive, non-racial 
nationalism (Muiu 2008:181). Critical to this discourse is the concept of inclusive citizenship. 
Essential to inclusive citizenship are notions of political freedom and equity. I further 
deconstructed equity into economic equity and equality before the law. To test whether 
perceptions of political freedom and equity have an effect on national identity, I include these 
concepts in an the regression. Because economic justice and empowerment was so central to the 
ANC discourse on inclusive citizenship, I include economic indicators such as a lived poverty 
index, perceptions of present and future economic conditions, perceptions of relative economic 
well-being compared to other South Africans, as well as perceptions of how well the government 
is narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor. 
 Standard controls for socio-economic status are also included in the model. These are 
gender, urban location, education, and age cohorts. Including age enables testing of whether 
younger generations of South Africans (the ‗born frees‘) identify with the nation more than older 
generations. In the analysis, I groups age cohorts by age 16 or younger in 1996, when the South 
African Constitution was approved by the Constitutional Court. If being in this age group proves 
to be statistically significant, it would suggest that there is a socialization effect and that citizens 
can be socialized into feeling a part of and pride in the nation. To take into account the various 
ways citizens can receive the ANC‘s message of inclusive citizenship, I test for partisan support 
and affiliation. ANC supporters and opposition supporters are included as dummy variables in 












inclusive citizenship was crucial to nation building in the ANC‘s message, it follows that ANC 
supporters would be the most receptive to it. News media consumption was also taken into 
account by including independent variables for newspaper, television, and radio news 
consumption.  
 I ran the three regression models for 2002, 2004, 2005 and 2008. Lack of continuity in 
questions asked over the earlier rounds makes it impossible to run the same model for any years 
before 2002. There are slight variations in wording for political freedom items in 2008, which 
are noted in Appendix D. In 2002, the survey questions asked respondents to compare their 
political freedoms in the present to political freedoms during Apartheid. The wording in the 2004 
and 2005 survey rounds ask respondents to compare their political freedoms to a few years ago 
and the 2008 survey simply asks about political freedoms in South Africa. Despite this slight 
variation, these items still embody the underlying concepts that measure the extent of perceived 
political freedoms.  
 By running OLS regressions for these years, we are able to see how the model fits over 
the 2002 to 2008 period. It sheds light on what informs national identity and how it has changed 
over time while allowing for comparisons by race. The first model tests for the relationship 
between the elements of inclusive citizenship with national identity with the entire population. 
The second model tests the same, while controlling for race. The third model tests for the added 
interaction effects of race and key variables of inclusive citizenship: perceptions of political 
freedom, equality before the law, economic equity, and future economic conditions. Due to the 
history of racial inequity in South Africa and the exclusion of those who were not White from 












racial groups in terms of magnitude and direction. For this reason, including interaction effects 
allows me to test if the factors that affect national identity vary across races. 
  
Model 1, Afrobarometer Rounds 2, 2.5, 3 and 4 
 The first model for years 2002, 2004, 2005 and 2008 shows that perception of political 
freedom has a strong and positive effect on national identity. In each survey year, political 
freedoms had the highest standardized Beta score, indicating that within each regression model, 
the perception of political freedoms has a stronger relationship to national identity than any other 
independent variable. ANC partisanship also has a strong relationship with national identity, 
which is to be expected since the ANC has been the ruling party since 1994 and many may be 
conflating the ANC (government) with South Africa (regime). The perception of equality before 
the law has a statistically significant relationship with national identity for each survey year, 
although the Beta coefficients are slight, ranging from .036 in 2002 to .072 in 2004. Among 
economic indicators, lived poverty has a negative relationship with national identity, which is to 
be expected given Maslow‘s theory of a hierarchy of needs—that those with deep poverty would 
feel less attachment to the nation. Since political freedoms have higher Beta coefficients than any 
of the other indicators of economic conditions, such as lived poverty, economic conditions 
compared to others, and perceptions of future economic conditions, this indicates that within the 
concept of inclusive citizenship, perceptions of political freedoms matter more for national 
identity than perceptions of economic well being. The perception of future economic conditions 
remains statistically significant over time and varies in the strength of the relationship with the 
weakest relationship in 2002 (B=.040) and the strongest relationship in 2004 (B=.130). In terms 












a negative relationship with national identity (B=-.046 and -.034, respectively). Television news 
consumption, on the other hand, has a positive relationship with national identity (2008, 
B=.042). This is to be expected, as newspaper media are more likely to feature investigative 
reporting, often with negative appraisals of government performance. Television news, with only 
two news providers (SABC ETV), tend to be more positive and provides less in depth news 
coverage. Gender, youth, age, radio news consumption, present economic condition, and 
opposition affiliation did not have a statistically significant effect on national identity for any of 












Model 1, Afrobarometer Rounds 2, 2.5, 3 and 4 
 2002  2004  2005  2008  
 B Beta B Beta B Beta B Beta 









































































































































































Dependent Variable = National Identity       p≤.05** p≤.01*** (Standard Error) 
2002 youth = age 18-22; 2004 youth = age 18-24; 2005 youth = age 18-25; 2008 youth = age 18-28 
 
Model 2, Afrobarometer Rounds 2, 2.5, 3 and 4 
When binary variables for race are added to the regression model, the adjusted r-square 
for each model increases for each year, indicating that these models are a better fit for predicting 












variables in the model, however it is important to note that the adjusted r-square values did not 
decrease in the second model. A strong race effect is also evident. Among the statistically 
significant relationships, being White has a strong relationship with national identity, although 
always negative. In 2005, being White had a B coefficient of .144 and 2008, the B= -.215. The 
direction of the coefficient shifts for Coloureds, with a positive relationship in 2004 (B=.261) 
and a negative relationship in 2005 (B= -.167). Being South Asian is only statistically significant 
in 2002 and has a negative relationship with national identity (B=-.220).  
 Despite this strong race effect, political freedom continues to have the highest Beta value 
in each year‘s model, meaning that perception of political freedoms accounts for the most 
difference in levels of national identity when compared to other independent variables in the 
model, including race. ANC partisanship also remains the second most important predictor for 
national identity except in 2004 and 2005, when the perception of future economic conditions 
has the second highest Beta loading in the model (.106 and .083, respectively).    
When looking at statistically significant economic indicators, in general, perceptions of 
individual living conditions compared to others have higher Betas than other measures of 
economic conditions indicating that economic equity (that is, economic conditions relative to 
others) is more important to national identity than absolute economic conditions. As in the first 
model, the perception of future economic conditions has a positive and statistically significant 
relationship with national identity for each year, and perceptions of present economic conditions 
are not significant for any year. This indicates that, in terms of economic satisfaction, South 
Africans are more forward thinking when it comes to identity and belonging and what matters 












evaluations for narrowing the gap between the rich and poor, this indicator of economic equity 
was only significant in 2002 with a B coefficient of .043.  
 As in the first model, perceptions of equality before the law have a positive and 
statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable although not in 2005 (2002, B= 
.039; 2004, B= .072; 2008, B= .045). Also, as in the previous model, opposition partisanship, 
gender, age, youth, radio news consumption, and perceptions of present economic conditions do 
not have statistically significant relationships with national identity for any year. This indicates 
that having an allegiance to an opposition party is not necessarily associated with being 
unpatriotic. Likewise, since youth is never statistically significant in any model for any year, 
being 'born free' doesn't have an effect on national identity compared to those who are not ‗born 
frees‘, i.e. lived under Apartheid. This indicates that there is less of a socialization effect on 
national identity than would be expected and that experiencing life (as someone who was 16 
years or younger in 1996) in the ‗New South Africa‘ doesn‘t necessarily affect one‘s sense of 
belonging in the nation.  
 Education has a positive relationship with national identity in 2004 and 2005, although 
the relationship is weak relative to other independent variables in the model (B= .038 and .024, 
respectively). One interesting finding is that in 2002, being from an Urban setting had a negative 
effect on national identity, but in 2005 the results were the opposite (B=-.88 and .097, 
respectively). This statistical anomaly might be affected by migration from rural to urban areas, 












 Model 2, Afrobarometer Rounds 2, 2.5, 3 and 4 
 2002  2004  2005  2008  
 B Beta B Beta B Beta B Beta 





































































































































































































Dependent Variable = National Identity       p≤.05** p≤.01*** (Standard Error) 















Model 3, Afrobarometer Rounds 2, 2.5, 3 and 4 with race and interaction effects 
 The final model adds interaction effects to better understand how race has a moderating 
effect between elements of inclusive citizenship and national identity. Again, the adjusted r-
squares in the final model are higher for every survey year than the previous models, indicating 
that adding interaction effects of race and elements of inclusive citizenship, results in a 
regression model that is a better fit model for predicting national identity than the previous 
models. Although, as in the previous model, this may be the result of the additional twelve 
independent variables in this model.  
The constant, which would be a Black rural female with no education, no party 
affiliation, no age, and a zero score on the other measures, is highest in 2008 (B=2.891) and 
lowest in 2004 (B=1.575) on the national identity index. Radio news consumption, opposition 
party affiliation, youth, age, and gender do not have a statistically significant relationship with 
national identity.  
Controlling for race and interaction effects within economic indicators, economic equity, 
when significant as in 2001 and 2005, has higher standardized Beta coefficients than any other 
economic indicator, suggesting that relative economic satisfaction is more pertinent to national 
identity that absolute economic conditions.  
ANC partisanship continues to have a strong and positive effect on national identity, 
which is to be expected. The effect of urban location and education play out in much the same 
way as in the previous model, with education having a positive, but small effect on national 
identity in 2004 and 2005 (B=.037 and .025, respectively), and being from an urban setting 












Considering that the third model tests for interaction effects, we still see that race has a 
statistically significant impact on national identity and that it varies over time. For example, in 
2005 and 2008, being White had a strong and negative effect on national identity (B=-.455 and 
B= -1.364, respectively). Being South Asian in 2008 had a very strong, negative relationship 
with national identity (B=-.770) and in these models, being Coloured also had a strong and 
negative relationship in 2005 (B=-919).  
To explore whether and how elements of inclusive citizenship matter to people of 
different races, we look at the interaction effects.  Among the interacted variables, the perception 
of political freedoms continues to have the strongest effect on national identity among the 
independent variables that relate to inclusive citizenship. To understand the relationship of the 
interacted term with the dependent variable, one needs to calculate the slope for each race by 
adding the B coefficient of each interacted term to the control variable.  
For Blacks, the perception of political freedom was statistically significant for each year 
(2002, B= .215; 2004, B= .273; 2005, B=.176; 2008, B= .084). For Whites, the perception of 
political freedoms were only significant for 2002, 2004, and 2008 (calculated slope = .007, .021 
and .315, respectively). For Coloureds, the perceptions of political freedoms is statistically 
significant in 2002, 2004, and 2005 (calculated slope = .033, .129 and .335, respectively). Only 
in 2002 and 2008 was the relationship between political freedoms and national identity 
statistically significant for South Asians (calculated slope = .366 and .307, respectively). Results 
from 2002 illustrate  how the perceptions of political freedoms matter differently to  national 
identity  for different races. Political freedoms barely have an effect on national identity for 
Whites and Coloureds in 2002. However, for Blacks and South Asians, the perception of 












relationships change drastically. For Blacks, the importance of political freedoms decline over 
the years. In contrast, for Whites and Coloureds, the perceptions of political freedoms become 
more important to a sense of national identity over the years. For South Asians, the importance 
decrease slightly, but is still quite high on par with Whites and Coloureds. 
Economic equity is another important variable in determining the strength of national 
identity, but changes depending on race. The perception of how well the government is 
improving the gap between the rich and poor are only statistically significant for Blacks in 2008 
(B= .077). For Whites, the perception of economic equity is significant in 2002 and 2008 
(calculated slope= .171 and .112, respectively). For Coloureds this relationship is significant in 
2005 (calculated slope= .192). Surprisingly, the relationship between economic equity and 
national identity is negative for South Asians (2005, calculated slope= -.249; 2008, calculated 
slope= -.350). There is not much change in the importance of economic equity over time within 
each race group, but there is a change in the relative importance compared to political freedoms 
over time. For Whites, in 2002, economic equity had a stronger relationship with national 
identity than political freedom. By 2008, the reverse is true. Political freedoms are more 
important to a sense of national identity than economic equity.  
Another measure of economic well-being, the perception of future economic conditions, 
are statistically significant for Blacks in 2004, 2005, and 2008 (B= .135, .054 and .055, 
respectively), for Whites in 2005 (calculated slope= .162), and for South Asians in 2008 
(calculated slope= .288). This indicates that, when significant, the perception of future economic 













The remaining interaction term of note is the perception of equality under the law. 
Statistically significant for Blacks in 2002 and 2005 (B= .045 and .075, respectively) and for 
Whites in 2008 (calculated slope= .160), it is interesting to note that for Whites in 2008, the 
perception of justice matters less than the perception of political freedoms, but slightly more than 
economic equity. 
To address the question of whether notions of inclusive citizenship matter to national 
identity, we see that these elements of inclusive citizenship do matter. However, the effects of 
freedoms and equity on national identity vary.  Overall, the perceptions of political freedoms 
have a stronger effect on national identity than perceptions of economic well being.  
We can see that in the final model race still has a statistically significant effect on 
national identity. However, the effect of race isn‘t consistent over the years. The adjusted r 
squares of each model range from .091 in 2004 to .162 in 2002, meaning that at best, this model 
is only explaining about 16% of the variation in national identity. This is perfectly acceptable by 
political science standards, but it also indicates that there are other things, which as Erasmus 
says, ‗lives behind the categories of race‘ that are not being represented in the model. 
From the final regression model, we see that notions of inclusive citizenship matter in 
different ways to South Africans of different races. There are statistically significant interaction 
effects, which indicate that notions of inclusive citizenship do matter differently, in type and 
degree. However, these effects change over time and are not consistent. For Blacks, the 
importance of political freedoms, one of the strongest predictors for national identity, is 
decreasing over time, whereas for Whites, it is increasing, the same is true for Coloureds and 












Perhaps, more importantly, the fact that they are inconsistent may indicate that the 
different ways the elements of inclusive citizenship matter to different races is not influenced by 
a legacy of the denial of formal and substantive citizenship under apartheid, but rather a 













Model 3, Afrobarometer Rounds 2, 2.5, 3 and 4 with race and interaction effects 
 2002  2004  2005  2008  


















































































































































































































































































Dependent Variable = National Identity       p≤.05** p≤.01*** (Standard Error) 
2002 youth = age 18-22; 2004 youth = age 18-24; 2005 youth = age 18-25; 2008 youth = age 18-28 
* The independent variables Radio News, Opposition, Age, and Youth were tested in this regression model but were 
















Results from Afrobarometer support the argument that a majority of South Africans 
subscribe to a national identity. National identity, when measured vertically, is strong in South 
Africa. However, levels of this identity are in an overall decline from 1995 to 2008. Further, 
there is some variation in levels of national identity by race. While a sense of national identity is 
in decline for most South Africans, for South Asians, there is a slight increase in the strength of 
national identity between 1998 and 2008.  
When examining whether South Africans desire a united South African nation and 
whether they think it is possible, there are notable variations among race. Overall, there is a 
decline in the desire to create a united nation, with the exception of White attitudes. More 
dramatic, is the attitude shift of Whites in their opinion of whether a united nation is possible. 
With a 25 percentage point increase between 1997 and 2008, more Whites feel that it is possible 
to have a united South African nation than they did before. While Blacks are becoming less 
optimistic about the possibility of having an inclusive South Africa, Whites, Coloureds and 
South Asians are becoming more optimistic about uniting a diverse nation.  
The ANC rhetoric of nation building stressed inclusive citizenship which encompassed 
the ideals of freedom and equity, both political and economic. Despite this rhetoric of inclusive 
citizenship, the ANC‘s nation building program focused its policies on economic development 
and equity. When breaking these concepts down into measurable indicators, such as perceptions 
of political freedoms, equality under the law, economic equity, economic conditions, and lived 
poverty, analysis of public opinion demonstrates that South Africans are dissatisfied with these 












political freedoms, although this satisfaction has declined over the years. They are most 
dissatisfied with the state of economic equity in South Africa, specifically with the way the 
government is handling narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor.  
Based on statistical analysis, certain elements of the nation building discourse of 
inclusive citizenship have a stronger relationship to national identity than others. Perceptions of 
political freedoms were more often a significant indicator of national identity than was economic 
equity or equality before the law, indicating that despite the efforts of the ANC nation building 
efforts that focused on economic development, South Africans find political freedoms more 
important to their sense of national identity than economic conditions, either relative or absolute. 
However, when looking among economic indicators only, the perception of a person‘s relative 
economic well-being compared to other South Africans had a stronger relationship with national 
identity than any other economic indicator, such as perceptions of current and future economic 
conditions and poverty. This suggests that the materialist argument to explain national sentiment 
is not valid in the South African case. Likewise, evidence from this analysis suggests that there is 
no socialization effect since the ‗born frees‘ were not more likely to identify with the nation than 
older generations who lived under the previous apartheid regime. 
            Further, as suspected, there is a race effect when examining the relationship between 
aspects of inclusive citizenship and national identity. However, these results are not consistent 
over the years, and we see a shift of the relative importance of political freedoms. For Blacks, 
political freedoms are becoming less important to a sense of national belonging. For Whites and 
Coloureds, it has become more important over the years. And for South Asians, the relevance of 












This analysis of the determinants of national identity in South Africa indicates that the 
ANC nation building program, that referenced inclusive citizenship but emphasized economic 
development, was misguided on two fronts.  Not only are South Africans dissatisfied with the 
delivery of economic aspects of inclusive citizenship, this analysis shows that economic well-
being and equity in the country are less relevant to a sense of national identity as other aspects of 















Suggestions For Further Research 
 This study was an inaugural attempt to understand what informs a person‘s sense of 
national identity in South Africa. Because there has not been a systematic, quantitative study 
with national identity as the dependent variable, this is a useful beginning to explore how 
national identity is formed and influenced. It is also useful to explore to what extent ANC nation 
building discourse of inclusive citizenship affects national identity in South Africa. 
 Of course, the perceptions of freedoms and equity, both political and economic, are not 
the only factors that may influence a person‘s sense of national identity. Because South Africa is 
a civic nation, tied to democratic ideals and system of government, it may be useful to test for 
other measures of satisfaction with government performance, perceptions of corruption, and 
perception of political representation in government to future regression models.   
I also suggest adding a measurement of national identity to future rounds of 
Afrobarometer that speaks to the respondent‘s attachment to others within South Africa. 
Currently, the multidimensional quality of national identity is not being adequately measured. In 
addition, I recommend that future rounds of Afrobarometer surveys allow for the respondent to 
self-identify their race, rather than the interviewer. 
Finally, a simultaneous equation model (SEM) would enable testing of the independent 
variables on more than one dependent variable, such as vertical and horizontal national identity 
(if both of those measures became available). A SEM would also be able to measure the 
simultaneous effects of each independent variable on the dependent variable as well as the other 
independent variables within the model, providing a more accurate picture of what informs 
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APPENDIX A: National Identity Index Creation 
National Identity Index Creation – Factor Analysis and Reliability Analysis 
     





     
2008 Afrobarometer Round 4   
     
 
Index 
Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 2.398) 
explains 69.988% of common variance. 










You would want your children to think of 




Being South African is a very important part 
of how you see yourself. 
0.804 
 
     
2006 Afrobarometer Round 3   
 
Index 
Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 2.445) 
explains 72.431% of common variance. 
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Being South African is a very important part 
of how you see yourself. 
0.798 
 
     
2004 Afrobarometer Round 2.5   
     
 
Index 
Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 2.737) 
explains 86.944% of common variance. 
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2002 Afrobarometer Round 2   
     
 
Index 
Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 2.555) 
explains 77.809% of common variance. 










You would want your children to think of 




Being South African is a very important part 
of how you see yourself. 
0.858 
 
     
2000 Afrobarometer Round 1   
     
 
Index 
Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 2.331) 
explains 66.647% of common variance. 










You would want your children to think of 




Being South African is a very important part 
of how you see yourself. 
0.793 
 
     
1998 Idasa    
     
 
Index 
Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue =2.228) 
explains 61.597% of common variance. 
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APPENDIX B: Univariate Analysis 
 
Mean scores 1995 1997 1998 2000 2002 2004 2005 2008 
           
National Identity Index   3.41 3.38 3.18 3.12 3.30 3.15 
Proud to be called a South African 3.43 3.47 3.46 3.42 3.19 3.12 3.32 3.20 
 




































Scale = 0-4 
 
 
Perceptions of Political Freedoms  
 2002 2004 2005 2008 
Black 3.22 3.04 3.20 2.38 
White 2.31 2.23 2.59 2.04 
Coloured 2.83 2.87 3.10 2.35 
South Asian 2.53 2.62 3.30 2.40 
Total 3.00 2.91 3.12 2.32 
Perceptions of Equality Under the Law 
  2002 2004 2005 2008 
Black 1.71 1.69 1.78 1.55 
White 1.24 1.41 1.56 1.26 
Coloured 1.48 1.67 1.47 1.37 
South Asian 1.59 1.39 1.94 1.28 
Total 1.60 1.64 1.73 1.46 
Perceptions of How the Government is Handling 
Narrowing the Gap Between the Rich and Poor 
  2002 2004 2005 2008 
Black 0.82 1.22 1.07 1.00 
White 0.77 0.67 0.89 0.93 
Coloured 0.76 1.06 0.79 0.78 
South Asian 0.59 0.69 1.14 0.68 
Total 0.79 1.11 1.03 0.94 
Perceptions of Current Economic Conditions 
 2002 2004 2005 2008 
Black 1.84 2.14 2.19 1.79 
White 1.62 2.11 2.18 1.49 
Coloured 1.76 2.24 2.15 1.57 
South Asian 1.80 2.10 2.49 1.90 
Total 1.79 2.15 2.19 1.72 
Perceptions of Future Economic 
Conditions  
 2002 2004 2005 2008 
Black 2.37 2.45 2.75 2.29 
White 1.72 1.94 2.30 1.44 
Coloured 2.08 2.47 2.68 2.03 
South Asian 1.57 2.26 2.95 1.89 












APPENDIX D: Variables in the Analysis 
 
2002 Afrobarometer Round 2   
     
Variables in the Analysis   
     






     
Dependent Variable    




Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 2.322) 
explains 77.405% of common variance. 





Here are some things people say about the way 
they feel about South Africa. There are no right or 
wrong answers. We are simply interested in your 
opinion. Please tell me whether you disagree, 
neither disagree nor agree, or agree with these 
statements:  
It makes you proud to be called a South African. 0.882  
  
You would want your children to think of 
themselves as South African. 0.904  
  
Being South African is a very important part of 
how you see yourself. 0.852  
       
Independent Variables   
     
Gender Item Respondent‘s gender (Answered by interviewer)  n/a 
Race Item Respondent‘s race (Answered by interviewer)  dropped 
 Urban Item 
Do you come from a rural or urban area? 
(Answered by interviewer)  n/a 
Age Item How old were you at your last birthday?  dropped 
Youth  Item Age 18 to 22 = 1, Age 23-91 =0  n/a 
Education Item 
What is the highest level of education you have 
completed?    dropped 
     
ANC  
Do you feel close to any particular political party? 
If so, which party is that?
25
   n/a 
Opposition  
Do you feel close to any particular political party? 
If so, which party is that?
26
   n/a 
                                                 
25
 Coded ANC if respondent chose African National Congress. 
26
Coded Opposition if respondent chose African Muslim Party, African Christian Democratic Party, Afrikanker 
Unity Movement/Afrikaner Eenheidsbeweging, Azanian Peoples Organization, Democratic Alliance-Democratic 
Party/Demokratiese Allianse – Demokratiese Party, Federal Alliance, Freedom Front/Vryheidsfront, Inkata Freedom 
Party/Inkatha Vryheidsparty, Minority Front, New National Party/Nuwe Nasionale Party, Pan Africanist Congress, 












     
Political 
Freedom Index 
Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 2.1) 
explains 69.324% of common variance. 





We are going to compare our present system of 
government with the former system of Apartheid 
rule. Please tell me if the following things are 
worse or better now than they used to be, or about 
the same: 
Freedom to say what you think?  0.822  
  
Freedom to join any political organization you 
want? 0.908  
  
Freedom to choose who to vote for without 
feeling pressured? 0.761  




In this country, how often: Are people treated 








How well or badly would you say the current 
government is handling the following matters, or 
haven‘t you heard enough about them to say: 
Narrowing gaps between rich and poor?  dropped 




vs. Others Item 
In general, how do you rate: Your living 













 Item Television   
 Item Radio   




Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 2.804) 
explains 46.741% of the common variance. 




Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or 
your family gone without: 
Enough food to eat? 0.692  
  Enough clean water for home use? 0.606  
  Medicines or medical treatment? 0.704  
  Enough fuel to cook your food?  0.782  
  A cash income? 0.639  
  Electricity in your home? 0.666  
     
Present 
Economic 
Conditions  Index 
Single unrotated factor (Initial Eigenvalue = 2.1) 
explains 52.558% of the total variance. Reliability 







Looking back, how do you rate the following 
compared to twelve months ago:  
Economic conditions in this country? .419  













In general, how would you describe:  
The present economic conditions of this country? .338  
  Your own present living conditions? .354  




The two items are correlated (Pearson's r) at .784. 
Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .878. 




Looking ahead, do you expect the following to be 
better or worse:  
Economic conditions in this country in twelve 
months time?   
  Your living conditions in twelve months time?   
 
 
2004 Afrobarometer Round 2.5   
     
Variables in the Analysis   
     






     
Dependent Variable    




Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 2.59) 
explains 86.322% of common variance. 





Here are some things people say about the way 
they feel about South Africa. There are no right or 
wrong answers. We are simply interested in your 
opinions. Please tell me whether you disagree, 
neither disagree nor agree, or agree with these 
statements.  
It makes you proud to be called a South African. 0.918  
  
You would want your children to think of 




Being South African is a very important part of 
how you see yourself. 
0.905 
 
       
Independent Variables   
     
Gender Item Respondent‘s gender (Answered by interviewer)  n/a 
Race Item Respondent‘s race (Answered by interviewer)  dropped 
Urban Item 
Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit (Answered 
by interviewer)  n/a 
Age Item How old were you at your last birthday?  dropped 
Youth Item Age 18-24=1, Age 25-91=0  n/a 
Education Item 
What is the highest level of education you have 
completed?    n/a 













Do you feel close to any particular political party? 
Which party is that?
27
   n/a 
Opposition  
Do you feel close to any particular political party? 
Which party is that?
28
  n/a 
     
Political 
Freedom Index 
Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 1.712) 
explains 57.072% of common variance. 





Please tell me if the following things are worse or 
better now than they were a few years ago, or are 
they about the same:  
Freedom to say what you think? 0.831  
  













In this country, how often: Are people treated 




     
Economic 
Equity Item 
How well or badly would you say the current 
government is handling the following matters, or 
haven‘t you heard enough about them to say: 
Narrowing gaps between rich and poor?  dropped 




vs. Others Item 
In general, how do you rate: Your living 













 Item Television?   
 Item Radio?   




Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 3.202) 
explains 53.366% of the common variance. 




Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or 
anyone in your family gone without:  
Enough food to eat? 
0.750 
 
  Enough clean water for home use? 0.735  
  Medicines or medical treatment? 0.744  
  Enough fuel to cook your food? 0.848  
                                                 
27
 Coded ANC if respondent chose African National Congress. 
28
Coded Opposition if respondent chose African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP), African Muslim Party 
(AMP), Afrikaner Unity Movement, Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO), Democratic Alliance-Democratic 
Party (DA-DP), Federal Alliance, Freedom Front, Inkata Freedom Party, Minority Front, New National Party, Pan 
Africanist Congress (PAC), United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP), United Democratic Movement(UDM), 












  A cash income? 0.663  
  Electricity in your home? 0.623  
     
Present 
Economic 
Conditions  Index 
Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 1.657) 
explains 41.433% of the common variance. 





Looking back, how do you rate the following 
compared to twelve months ago:  
Economic conditions in this country? .671  
  Your living conditions? .767  
  
In general, how would you describe:  
The present economic conditions of this country? .541  
  







The two items are correlated (Pearson's r) at .697. 
Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .821. 




Looking ahead, do you expect the following to be 
better or worse:  
Economic conditions in this country in twelve 
months time?   
  Your living conditions in twelve months time?   
 
 
2005 Afrobarometer Round 3   
     
Variables in the Analysis   
     






     
Dependent Variable    




Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 2.185) 
explains 72.821% of common variance. 





Here are some things people say about the way 
they feel about South Africa. There are no right or 
wrong answers. We are simply interested in your 
opinions. Please tell me whether you disagree, 
neither disagree nor agree, or agree with these 
statements.  
It makes you proud to be called a South African. .875  
  
You would want your children to think of 




Being South African is a very important part of 
how you see yourself. 
.800 
 
       
Independent Variables   
     
Gender Item Respondent‘s gender (Answered by interviewer)  n/a 
Race Item Respondent‘s race (Answered by interviewer)  dropped 













Age Item How old are you?  dropped 
Youth Item Age 18-25=1, Age 26-91=0  n/a 
Education Item 
What is the highest level of education you have 
completed?    n/a 
     
ANC  
Do you feel close to any particular political party? 
Which party is that?
29
   n/a 
Opposition  
Do you feel close to any particular political party? 
Which party is that?
30
  n/a 
     
Political 
Freedom Index 
Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 1.957) 
explains 65.229% of common variance. 





Please tell me if the following things are worse or 
better now than they were a few years ago, or are 
they about the same:  
Freedom to say what you think? 0.801  
  













In this country, how often: Are people treated 




     
Economic 
Equity Item 
How well or badly would you say the current 
government is handling the following matters, or 
haven‘t you heard enough to say: Narrowing gaps 
between rich and poor?  dropped 




vs. Others Item 
In general, how do you rate: Your living 













 Item Television?   
 Item Radio?   
     
Lived 
Poverty Index 
Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 3.161) 
explains 52.676% of the common variance. 
 
dropped 
                                                 
29
 Coded ANC if respondent chose African National Congress. 
30
Coded Opposition if respondent chose African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP), African Muslim Party 
(AMP), Afrikaner Unity Movement, Alliance of Free Democrats, Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO), 
Christian Party, Democratic Alliance-Democratic Party (DA-DP), Federal Alliance, Federal Democrats, Freedom 
Front, Independent Democrats (ID), Inkata Freedom Party, Minority Front, National Democratic Convention 
(NADECO), New National Party (NNP), Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), Progressive Independent Movement, 
United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP), United Democratic Movement(UDM), United Independent Front, 












Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .866. 
  
Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or 
anyone in your family gone without:  
Enough food to eat? 
0.685 
 
  Enough clean water for home use? 0.666  
  Medicines or medical treatment? 0.740  
  Enough fuel to cook your food? 0.809  
  A cash income? 0.750  
  Electricity in your home? 0.696  
     
Present 
Economic 
Conditions  Index 
Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 1.816) 
explains 45.407% of the common variance. 





Looking back, how do you rate the following 
compared to twelve months ago:  
Economic conditions in this country? .737  
  Your living conditions? .783  
  
In general, how would you describe:  
The present economic conditions of this country? .576  
  Your own present living conditions? .572  




The two items are correlated (Pearson's r) at .753. 






Looking ahead, do you expect the following to be 
better or worse:  
Economic conditions in this country in twelve 
months time?   
  Your living conditions in twelve months time?   
 
 
2008 Afrobarometer Round 4   
     
Variables in the Analysis   
     






     
Dependent Variable    
     
 
Index 
Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 2.166) 
explains 72.205% of common variance. Reliability 




 It makes you proud to be called a South African. 0.867  
  
You would want your children to think of themselves 




Being South African is a very important part of how 
you see yourself. 
0.821 
 
        
Independent Variables   













What is the respondent's gender? (Answered by 
interviewer)  n/a 
Race Item Respondent‘s race (Answered by interviewer)  dropped 
Urban Item 
Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit (Answered 
by interviewer)  n/a 
Age Item How old are you?  n/a 
Youth Item Age 18-28=1, Age 29-97=0   
Education Item 
What is the highest level of education you have 
completed?    n/a 
     
ANC  Do you feel close to any particular political party? 





Do you feel close to any particular political party? 
Which party is that?
32
  n/a 
     
Political 
Freedom Index 
Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 2.010) 
explains 67.003% of common variance. Reliability 




In this country, how free are you: 
To say what you think? 
.683 
 
  To join any political organization you want? .886  
  To vote for without feeling pressured? .871  




In your opinion, how often, in this country are people 




     
Economic 
Equity Item 
How well or badly would you say the former Mbeki 
government was handling the following matters, or 
haven‘t you heard enough to say? Narrowing gaps 
between rich and poor  dropped 




vs. Others Item 
In general, how do you rate your living conditions 




     
News 
Media Item 




 Item Television?   
 Item Radio?   
     
Lived 
Poverty Index 
Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 2.952) 
explains 49.193% of the common variance. 
 
dropped 
                                                 
31
 Coded ANC if respondent chose African National Congress. 
32
Coded Opposition if respondent chose African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP), African Muslim Party 
(AMP), Afrikaner Unity Movement, Alliance of Free Democrats, Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO), 
Christian Party, Democratic Alliance-Democratic Party (DA-DP), Federal Democrats, Freedom Front, Independent 
Democrats (ID), Inkata Freedom Party, Minority Front, National Democratic Convention (NADECO), New 
National Party (NNP), Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP), United 
Democratic Movement(UDM), United Independent Front, ANC Breakaway Party / new Lekota or George or 












Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .844. 
  
Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or 
anyone in your family gone without:  
Enough food to eat? 
.722 
 
  Enough clean water for home use? .638  
  Medicines or medical treatment? .692  
  Enough fuel to cook your food? .834  
  A cash income? .662  
  Electricity in your home? .641  
     
Present 
Economic 
Conditions  Index 
Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 1.721) 
explains 43.026% of the common variance. 





Looking back, how do you rate the following 
compared to twelve months ago:  
Economic conditions in this country? 
.704 
 
  Your living conditions? .790  
  
In general, how would you describe:  
The present economic conditions of this country? .547  
  Your own present living conditions? .550  




The two items are correlated (Pearson's r) at .768. 
Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .868. 




Looking ahead, do you expect the following to be 
better or worse:  
Economic conditions in this country in twelve 
months time?   
  Your living conditions in twelve months time?   
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